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Berserk Bear Threat Actor Profile Guide: energy sector and ICS reconnaissance defences

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By NHI Mgmt Group, edited by Lalit Choda Updated 27 October 2026 11 min read
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Berserk Bear, best known as Dragonfly or Energetic Bear, spent most of a decade getting into energy companies and industrial control system suppliers, and the US and UK governments attribute that work to Russia's FSB Center 16. Its campaigns trojanised ICS vendor software, watered the websites engineers visit, harvested credentials through Office templates and SMB, and then created hidden local accounts and browsed for SCADA files and screenshots. Public reporting describes reconnaissance and pre-positioning rather than confirmed sabotage, which is exactly why OT defenders need to recognise it early. This profile is for OT and ICS security engineers, energy and utility SOC teams and threat intelligence staff. It covers names and attribution as each source states it, targeting, ATT&CK Enterprise and ICS techniques, how the group abuses accounts and credentials, notable campaigns and a detection and defence plan. The geopolitical context is in the Cyber Warfare Guide; this page focuses on the actor.

Key takeaways

  • Supply chain first, at scale. The US Department of Justice says the 2012 to 2014 Havex campaign hid malware in legitimate ICS vendor software updates and reached more than 17,000 unique devices.
  • Credentials are harvested before any malware runs. Office documents with SMB template links and modified LNK icons make Windows send NTLM hashes to attacker servers, mapped in ATT&CK as Forced Authentication (T1187).
  • It builds its own accounts. ATT&CK records local administrator accounts disguised as backup, service or email admin accounts, hidden through the registry and logged out every eight hours by a scheduled task.
  • The objective is OT knowledge. Browsing file servers for ICS and SCADA files, screenshots of machines labelled "cntrl" and OPC enumeration modules in Backdoor.Oldrea point at control systems.
  • Protect the IT to OT path. Blocking outbound SMB, removing standing remote access to OT, and alerting on new local admin accounts break most of the chain.

Who they are (names and aliases)

MITRE ATT&CK tracks the group as Dragonfly (G0035), a cyber espionage group attributed to Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB) Center 16, active since at least 2010, targeting defence and aviation companies, government entities, ICS-related companies and critical infrastructure. The US Department of Justice, unsealing indictments in March 2022, identified the actors as officers of FSB Military Unit 71330, also called Center 16. The UK government's FSB factsheet states that it is confirming the activity was carried out by FSB Centre 16; its organogram lists Turla aliases under the same centre, so treat Centre 16 as an organisation, not a single team. Dragos tracks related ICS activity from 2015 as DYMALLOY and considers it separate from the 2011 to 2014 Dragonfly activity, making no assessment of the government attribution.

NameTracked byNotes
Dragonfly; Dragonfly 2.0Symantec, ATT&CK (Dragonfly 2.0 merged into G0035)Campaign names for 2011 to 2014 and from late 2015
Berserk Bear, Energetic Bear, Crouching YetiVendors, named in DOJ and UK government statementsMost common names in press
Ghost Blizzard (earlier BROMINE)MicrosoftListed as aliases in ATT&CK
IRON LIBERTY, TG-4192SecureworksListed in ATT&CK and the UK factsheet
DYMALLOYDragosICS-focused tracking; Dragos sees it as related but distinct
TEMP.IsotopeMandiantListed as an alias in ATT&CK

For the wider family of Russian services, see the Russia State Cyber Operations Guide; for a GRU group that has carried out OT disruption, see the Sandworm Threat Actor Profile.

Targeting and motivation

  • Energy and its suppliers: DOJ lists oil and gas firms, nuclear power plants, and utility and power transmission companies across about 135 countries. Symantec saw Dragonfly 2.0 activity in the United States, Turkey and Switzerland; Dragos adds transportation.
  • Wider critical infrastructure: the UK factsheet lists energy, healthcare, finance, education and government, a 2020 aviation campaign, and a March 2018 US alert covering energy, nuclear, commercial facilities, water, aviation and critical manufacturing.
  • Staging targets: ATT&CK records the group collecting open source information on business relationships (T1591.002), and the campaigns used smaller suppliers and websites trusted by engineers as stepping stones to the real targets.
  • Motivation: espionage and access. DOJ describes the goal as access that would let the Russian government disrupt or damage systems later. Symantec assessed in 2017 that the group potentially had the ability to sabotage or take control of the systems it had reached; no source reviewed reports confirmed sabotage.

Tactics and techniques (MITRE ATT&CK)

Techniques are mapped to G0035 (or to its malware Backdoor.Oldrea, S0093, for ICS rows) in ATT&CK v20.

TacticTechniqueHow it shows up
Initial accessT1195.002 Compromise Software Supply Chain; ICS T0862 Supply Chain CompromiseTrojanised installers for control system software on vendor websites
Initial accessT1189 Drive-by Compromise; ICS T0817Watering holes on energy sector sites, redirect iframes
Initial access, reconnaissanceT1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment; T1598.002 and T1598.003 Phishing for InformationOffice documents and PDF links to credential harvesting pages
Initial accessT1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application; T1133 External Remote ServicesSQL injection; Citrix CVE-2019-19781, Exchange CVE-2020-0688, Fortinet CVE-2018-13379 (AA20-296A); VPN and OWA
Credential accessT1187 Forced Authentication; T1221 Template InjectionSMB URLs in Word templates and modified LNK icons leak NTLM hashes
Credential accessT1003.002, T1003.003, T1003.004; T1110.002 Password CrackingSecretsDump, ntds.dit from domain controllers, Hydra and CrackMapExec
Privilege escalationT1210 Exploitation of Remote ServicesNetlogon CVE-2020-1472 against Active Directory
PersistenceT1136.001 Local Account; T1098.007 Additional Local or Domain GroupsNew local admin accounts tailored to each target
StealthT1036.010 Masquerade Account Name; T1564.002 Hidden UsersAccounts named like backup or service accounts, hidden via registry
PersistenceT1505.003 Web Shell; T1053.005 Scheduled TaskWeb shells on mail and web servers; task logging out created accounts every eight hours
Lateral movement, discoveryT1021.001 Remote Desktop Protocol; T1135 Network Share DiscoveryRDP; browsing file servers for ICS and SCADA files
CollectionT1113 Screen Capture; T1114.002 Remote Email Collectionscr.exe screenshots; mailboxes read through OWA
Defence impairmentT1685.005 Clear Windows Event Logs; T1686 Disable or Modify System FirewallCleared system, security and terminal services logs; disabled host firewalls and opened port 3389
ICS discoveryICS T0846 Remote System Discovery; T0888 Remote System Information Discovery; T0861 Point and Tag IdentificationOldrea OPC module enumerates OPC servers and tags; it also crashed some OPC platforms (T0814)

How they abuse identities and credentials

Dragonfly's playbook is identity-heavy: harvest a hash, crack or relay it, create an account that looks like it belongs, and use legitimate remote access. Each move has a specific control.

MoveDetail from sourcesControl
Leak NTLM hashesDocument templates and LNK icons point to attacker SMB servers (T1187)Block outbound TCP 445 and 139 at the perimeter; restrict outgoing NTLM to remote servers by Group Policy; add privileged users to Protected Users
Crack and reuseHydra, CrackMapExec, SecretsDump, ntds.dit theftLong passphrases, banned password lists, Tier 0 protection of domain controllers, fast patching of Netlogon-class flaws
Create look-alike accountsLocal admins named like backup, service or email admin accounts, hidden in the registryAlert on every new local account and local Administrators membership change; reconcile local accounts against an inventory of real service accounts
Use remote accessVPN and OWA access with valid credentials; RDP opened on 3389MFA on VPN and webmail; jump hosts with MFA for any IT to OT access; no direct RDP into OT
Read mailOWA mailbox access (T1114.002)Phishing-resistant MFA, sign-in risk alerts, mailbox audit logging

Notable incidents

DateCampaignSource
2012 to 2014Havex supply chain campaign against ICS and SCADA vendors; more than 17,000 devices; June to July 2013 trojanised software of a European PLC manufacturerDOJ, March 2022; UK FSB factsheet
December 2015 to 2017Dragonfly 2.0 against European and North American energy; Phishery templates, watering holes, Karagany.B, HeriplorSymantec, October 2017
2014 to 2017Spearphishing of more than 3,300 users at more than 500 organisations and US agencies; compromise of the business network (not ICS) of Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating CorporationDOJ, March 2022
March and April 2018US alert on targeting of energy, nuclear, water, aviation and manufacturing; UK advisory on engineering and ICS companiesUK FSB factsheet citing CISA and NCSC
2020Exploitation of Citrix, Exchange and Fortinet flaws and Netlogon against US targets; the UK notes an aviation campaignATT&CK citing AA20-296A; UK factsheet

Detection and defence

Detection signals

SignalWhere to lookNotes
Outbound SMB (TCP 445) or WebDAV to the internetFirewall and proxy logsForced authentication; should be blocked and alerted
Office documents loading templates from file:// or UNC pathsEDR, Sysmon network eventsTemplate injection for hash theft
New local accounts (Event ID 4720) and additions to local Administrators (4732)Windows Security log, SIEMEspecially names resembling backup or service accounts
Registry changes under Winlogon SpecialAccounts UserListSysmon Event ID 13Hides an account from the sign-in screen
Security log cleared (Event ID 1102) or event log service stoppedSIEM forwarded logsLogs must be forwarded before they can be cleared locally
Host firewall disabled or 3389 opened globallyWindows Firewall events, configuration driftMatches T1686 behaviour
IT accounts browsing OT project files, HMI exports or SCADA documentation sharesFile server audit (4663)Reconnaissance for control systems
Unexpected OPC enumeration or OPC server crashesOT network monitoring, historian logsOldrea module behaviour

Defence plan

  1. Week 1: block outbound SMB and WebDAV at the perimeter, confirm VPN and OWA require MFA, and patch or isolate any internet-facing Citrix, Exchange or Fortinet systems still exposed to the cited CVEs.
  2. Weeks 2 to 4: forward Security, System and terminal services logs to the SIEM; create alerts for new local admins, hidden users, log clearing and firewall changes; test each rule with a controlled change.
  3. Weeks 4 to 8: restrict outgoing NTLM in audit mode first (Network security: Restrict NTLM policies), review the audit events, then enforce for remote servers; add administrators to Protected Users. Roll back by returning the policy to audit if business systems fail.
  4. Quarter 1: move all IT to OT access through MFA-protected jump hosts, remove standing vendor accounts, verify ICS software downloads with vendor hashes or signatures before installation, and deploy passive OT network monitoring.
  5. Ongoing: review file share permissions on OT documentation and run a hunt each quarter for look-alike service accounts.

Metrics

  • Outbound SMB connections permitted to the internet: zero.
  • Remote access paths into OT without MFA: zero.
  • Local admin accounts not in the inventory: zero after each quarterly reconciliation.
  • ICS software installs with verified hash or signature: 100%.
  • Hosts forwarding Security logs to the SIEM: above 98%, including engineering workstations.

Framework mapping

FrameworkReferenceRelevance
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5SR-3 Supply Chain Controls and Processes, SR-11 Component Authenticity, SI-7 Software, Firmware, and Information IntegrityTrojanised ICS installers
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5AC-2 Account Management, AC-6 Least PrivilegeLook-alike accounts and admin group changes
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5SC-7 Boundary Protection, AU-6 Audit Record Review, Analysis, and ReportingOutbound SMB blocking, log review
NIST CSF 2.0GV.SC-07, PR.AA-05, PR.PS-04, DE.CM-01Supplier risk, access permissions, log generation, network monitoring
MITRE ATT&CK for ICST0862, T0817, T0846, T0861OT-specific detection planning; see the MITRE ATT&CK for ICS Guide

Practitioner checklist

  • Block outbound SMB and WebDAV and alert on any attempt.
  • Restrict outgoing NTLM, starting in audit mode.
  • Alert on new local accounts, local admin changes and hidden user registry keys.
  • Forward logs off host and alert on log clearing and firewall changes.
  • Require MFA on VPN, OWA and every route into OT; remove standing vendor access.
  • Verify ICS vendor software by hash or signature before installing.
  • Restrict who can read OT documentation, HMI exports and SCADA project files.
  • Deploy passive OT monitoring able to flag unexpected OPC enumeration.

Standards and references

Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: Cyber Warfare Guide · Energy Sector Identity and OT Access Guide · Watering Hole Attacks Guide · OT Security Guide · Threat Actor Groups Guide

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NHIMG Editorial Note
Researched and written by the NHI Mgmt Group editorial team using AI tools, under the editorial direction of Lalit Choda. Facts are drawn from the sources listed on this page and checked by our automated quality process. Last updated 27 October 2026. Spotted an error? Use our contact page.
NHI Mgmt Group, the independent authority on Non-Human Identity, IAM and Agentic AI security. nhimg.org

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