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Cadet Blizzard Threat Actor Profile Guide: WhisperGate, GRU Unit 29155 and defences

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By NHI Mgmt Group, edited by Lalit Choda Updated 27 October 2026 10 min read
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Cadet Blizzard, also tracked as Ember Bear, is the group that wiped Ukrainian government systems with WhisperGate a month before Russia's full-scale invasion, and Western governments attribute it to a GRU unit that has since scanned and attacked critical infrastructure across NATO. Its tradecraft is opportunistic: public exploits against Confluence, Exchange, firewalls and IP cameras, default passwords, password spraying against webmail, then Impacket, credential dumps and tunnels. This profile is for SOC analysts, infrastructure owners and threat intelligence teams in government, energy, transport, finance and healthcare, and anyone supporting Ukraine. It covers names and attribution as each source states it, targeting, the ATT&CK techniques mapped to the group, its heavy reliance on stolen and default credentials, notable incidents and a detection and hardening plan. Wiper mechanics and recovery are covered in the Wiper Malware Guide; this page focuses on the actor.

Key takeaways

  • Attribution is formal and multinational. Advisory AA24-249A, co-sealed by US, UK, Canadian, Australian, Dutch, Czech, German, Estonian, Latvian and Ukrainian agencies, attributes the activity to GRU Unit 29155, the 161st Specialist Training Center.
  • Destruction plus leaks plus defacement. WhisperGate wiped Master Boot Records from 13 January 2022, alongside website defacements and a hack-and-leak forum.
  • Exposed and default credentials are the cheap way in. The advisory describes Dahua camera authentication bypass and default passwords, plaintext credentials pulled from camera configs, and password spraying against Outlook Web Access.
  • Post-exploitation is commodity tooling. Impacket, CrackMapExec, BloodHound, Responder, renamed procdump, GOST and ProxyChains, which means generic detections for these tools pay off directly.
  • Phishing-resistant MFA on webmail and VPN is the first fix. The advisory names it for all externally facing services alongside patching against the KEV catalogue.

Who they are (names and aliases)

MITRE ATT&CK tracks the group as Ember Bear (G1003), a Russian state-sponsored cyber espionage group active since at least 2020 and linked to the GRU 161st Specialist Training Center (Unit 29155). The joint advisory of 5 September 2024 states that Unit 29155 is separate from other GRU units such as 26165 and 74455, and lists the industry names below while noting that they do not map one to one to US government tracking. Microsoft assesses that Cadet Blizzard is linked to the GRU but separate from Forest Blizzard and Seashell Blizzard.

NameTracked byNotes
GRU Unit 29155 (161st Specialist Training Center)FBI, CISA, NSA and partners (AA24-249A)Government attribution
Cadet Blizzard (earlier DEV-0586)MicrosoftNamed in June 2023
Ember Bear, Bleeding BearVendors, ATT&CKATT&CK primary name is Ember Bear
UNC2589, Frozenvista, UAC-0056Vendors and CERT-UA, listed in the advisory and ATT&CKUAC-0056 is also listed by ATT&CK under Saint Bear, so check context

For comparison with the other GRU units, see the APT28 (Fancy Bear) Threat Actor Profile (Unit 26165) and the Sandworm Threat Actor Profile (Unit 74455).

Targeting and motivation

  • Regions: NATO members in Europe and North America, EU countries, Ukraine, and countries in Latin America, Central America, Central Asia and Asia (AA24-249A).
  • Sectors: government services, financial services, transportation systems, energy and healthcare. Microsoft adds IT providers, law enforcement, NGOs and emergency services, and notes repeated supply chain compromise of IT providers.
  • Scale of reconnaissance: the advisory reports more than 14,000 domain scanning instances across at least 26 NATO members.
  • Motivation: the advisory says that since early 2022 the primary focus has been disrupting efforts to aid Ukraine, through espionage, sabotage and reputational harm: data theft, leaks, defacements and destruction.

Tactics and techniques (MITRE ATT&CK)

All techniques below are mapped to G1003 in ATT&CK v20 and match behaviour described in AA24-249A or Microsoft's 2023 report.

TacticTechniqueHow it shows up
ReconnaissanceT1595.001 Scanning IP Blocks; T1595.002 Vulnerability ScanningNmap, MASSCAN, Acunetix, WPScan; Shodan to find IoT devices
Initial accessT1190 Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationConfluence CVE-2022-26134 and CVE-2022-26138, Sophos Firewall CVE-2022-3236, Dahua CVE-2021-33044 and CVE-2021-33045; Microsoft adds Confluence CVE-2021-26084 and Exchange CVE-2022-41040
Initial accessT1078.001 Default Accounts; T1133 External Remote ServicesDefault passwords on internet-exposed IP cameras; VPNs for access and persistence
Initial accessT1195 Supply Chain CompromiseIT providers and software developers serving the real targets
Credential accessT1110.003 Password Spraying; T1110 Brute ForceSpraying Outlook Web Access; su-bruteforce against local Linux users
Credential accessT1003.001 LSASS Memory; T1003.002 Security Account Manager; T1003.004 LSA Secretsprocdump renamed dump64.exe, reg save of hives, Impacket secretsdump
Credential accessT1552.001 Credentials In FilesCamera configuration dumps containing plaintext credentials
Lateral movementT1550.002 Pass the Hash; T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation; T1021 Remote ServicesImpacket psexec and WMI with hashes
PersistenceT1505.003 Web Shell; T1053.005 Scheduled TaskP.A.S., reGeorg and p0wnyshell web shells; remote scheduled tasks
Command and controlT1572 Protocol Tunneling; T1090.003 Multi-hop Proxy; T1071.004 DNS; T1095 Non-Application Layer ProtocolProxyChains, GOST renamed to java, dnscat/2 and Iodine DNS tunnels, Netcat
Collection, exfiltrationT1114 Email Collection; T1125 Video Capture; T1567.002 Exfiltration to Cloud StoragePowerShell mailbox export requests; camera images; Rclone to MEGA
StealthT1036 Masquerading; T1070.004 File DeletionRenamed tools; deletion of lateral movement artefacts
ImpactT1561.002 Disk Structure Wipe; T1491.002 External DefacementWhisperGate MBR wiping; defacement of Ukrainian websites

How they abuse identities and credentials

Almost every stage of a Unit 29155 intrusion described in the advisory turns on a credential that was default, reused, single-factor or stored in clear text.

Credential weaknessHow the actor uses itFix
Default device passwordsLogs in to exposed IP cameras found via Shodan, then dumps configs with plaintext credentialsChange all default credentials, remove cameras from the internet, put them behind a VPN or gateway. See the IP Camera and CCTV Security Guide
Single-factor webmailPassword sprays OWA, then exports mailboxes with PowerShellPhishing-resistant MFA on OWA and VPN; restrict the Mailbox Import Export role to a small admin group and alert on its use
Reusable NTLM hashesDumps LSASS, SAM and LSA secrets, then moves with pass the hash over SMB and WMICredential Guard, LSASS protection, unique local admin passwords with Windows LAPS, block NTLM where possible
Service and machine secrets on hostsLSA secrets hold service account passwords; SSH keys are collected from target systemsMove service accounts to gMSA, vault SSH keys and rotate them after any intrusion. See the Group Managed Service Accounts (gMSA) Guide and the SSH Key Management Guide
Trusted third partiesCompromises IT providers to reach their customersScope and monitor provider accounts, require MFA and time-bound access for vendor sessions
  • Treat Linux too: su-bruteforce targets local accounts, so enforce lockout via PAM faillock and alert on repeated su failures.
  • After eviction, rotate everything that was reachable: domain credentials exposed to secretsdump, service account passwords, SSH keys and device passwords. Rebuilding hosts without rotating these leaves the actor a way back.

Notable incidents

DateEventSource
From 2020Group active, per ATT&CK and the advisoryATT&CK G1003; AA24-249A
13 January 2022WhisperGate deployed against Ukrainian government organisations; website defacements the same monthAA24-249A; Microsoft, 14 June 2023
2022 to 2023Leaks of stolen data through the Free Civilian forum; a Telegram channel of the same name appears in February 2023Microsoft
2022 to 2024Scanning across at least 26 NATO members; intrusions into government, energy, transport, finance and healthcareAA24-249A
5 September 2024Joint advisory AA24-249A published by FBI, CISA, NSA and international partnersAA24-249A

Detection and defence

Detection signals

SignalWhere to lookNotes
Many failed OWA sign-ins across accounts from VPN or Tor exit addressesIIS logs on Exchange, identity provider logsThe group used IVPN, SurfShark and Tor for anonymity
New-MailboxExportRequest or other mailbox export activityExchange admin audit logRarely legitimate outside eDiscovery
procdump or a renamed binary opening LSASS; reg save of SAM, SYSTEM or SECURITYSysmon Event ID 10 and 1, EDRMicrosoft cites dump64.exe as a seen name
Impacket patterns: services created with random names, WMI child processes writing output to ADMIN$Event ID 7045, 4688, EDRThe advisory asks defenders to detect Impacket, PsExec and WMI
Long or high-volume DNS queries to one domainDNS logsdnscat/2 and Iodine tunnelling; see the DNS Security Guide
Processes named java or other common names making outbound tunnels from serversEDR, NetFlowGOST renamed to match legitimate software
Rclone or large uploads to MEGAProxy logs, EDRExfiltration to cloud storage
Attempts to write to the MBR or volume boot recordEDR, controlled folder access eventsWhisperGate behaviour

Hardening plan

  1. Week 1: patch or isolate every internet-facing system listed in the advisory, starting with entries in CISA's KEV catalogue; take IP cameras off the internet and change their default passwords.
  2. Weeks 2 to 4: require phishing-resistant MFA on webmail, VPN and remote access; block legacy authentication; alert on password spray patterns.
  3. Weeks 4 to 8: enable Credential Guard and LSASS protection in audit mode, then enforce; deploy Windows LAPS; turn on attack surface reduction rules that block process creation from PsExec and WMI, and controlled folder access, testing on a pilot ring with rollback to audit mode if business applications fail.
  4. Quarter 1: segment networks to limit lateral movement; restrict PowerShell to current versions with logging; send logs to a protected remote store; review third-party provider access.
  5. Resilience: keep offline, tested backups and a wiper response runbook. See the Wiper Attack Response Playbook.

Metrics

  • External services without phishing-resistant MFA: target zero.
  • Internet-facing KEV vulnerabilities past due date: target zero.
  • Internet-exposed cameras and IoT devices: target zero, verified by external scans each month.
  • Hosts with Credential Guard or LSASS protection: above 95%.
  • Time to restore a critical system from offline backup: tested at least twice a year.

Framework mapping

FrameworkReferenceRelevance
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5IA-2 Identification and Authentication, AC-7 Unsuccessful Logon Attempts, IA-5 Authenticator ManagementMFA, spraying and default credentials
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5RA-5 Vulnerability Monitoring and Scanning, SI-2 Flaw RemediationClosing the exploited CVEs
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5SI-4 System Monitoring, AU-9 Protection of Audit InformationDetecting tools and protecting logs
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5CP-9 System Backup, CP-10 System Recovery and ReconstitutionRecovering from wiper attacks
NIST CSF 2.0PR.AA-03, PR.DS-11, RC.RP-01Authentication, backups, executing the recovery plan

Practitioner checklist

  • Check exposure to every CVE in AA24-249A and confirm patches are applied on Confluence, Exchange, Sophos and Dahua devices.
  • Remove IP cameras from direct internet exposure and change every default password.
  • Enforce phishing-resistant MFA on OWA, VPN and remote access, and alert on spraying.
  • Audit who holds the Exchange Mailbox Import Export role and alert on export requests.
  • Deploy detections for Impacket, renamed procdump, GOST, ProxyChains, DNS tunnels and Rclone.
  • Move service accounts to gMSA and vault SSH keys; plan rotation after any intrusion.
  • Enable controlled folder access and keep offline backups to limit wiper damage.
  • Review access held by IT providers and require MFA and time-bound sessions.

Standards and references

Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: Wiper Malware Guide · Russia State Cyber Operations Guide · Gamaredon Group Threat Actor Profile Guide · Cyber Warfare Guide · Threat Actor Groups Guide

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NHIMG Editorial Note
Researched and written by the NHI Mgmt Group editorial team using AI tools, under the editorial direction of Lalit Choda. Facts are drawn from the sources listed on this page and checked by our automated quality process. Last updated 27 October 2026. Spotted an error? Use our contact page.
NHI Mgmt Group, the independent authority on Non-Human Identity, IAM and Agentic AI security. nhimg.org

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