Cadet Blizzard, also tracked as Ember Bear, is the group that wiped Ukrainian government systems with WhisperGate a month before Russia's full-scale invasion, and Western governments attribute it to a GRU unit that has since scanned and attacked critical infrastructure across NATO. Its tradecraft is opportunistic: public exploits against Confluence, Exchange, firewalls and IP cameras, default passwords, password spraying against webmail, then Impacket, credential dumps and tunnels. This profile is for SOC analysts, infrastructure owners and threat intelligence teams in government, energy, transport, finance and healthcare, and anyone supporting Ukraine. It covers names and attribution as each source states it, targeting, the ATT&CK techniques mapped to the group, its heavy reliance on stolen and default credentials, notable incidents and a detection and hardening plan. Wiper mechanics and recovery are covered in the Wiper Malware Guide; this page focuses on the actor.
Key takeaways
- Attribution is formal and multinational. Advisory AA24-249A, co-sealed by US, UK, Canadian, Australian, Dutch, Czech, German, Estonian, Latvian and Ukrainian agencies, attributes the activity to GRU Unit 29155, the 161st Specialist Training Center.
- Destruction plus leaks plus defacement. WhisperGate wiped Master Boot Records from 13 January 2022, alongside website defacements and a hack-and-leak forum.
- Exposed and default credentials are the cheap way in. The advisory describes Dahua camera authentication bypass and default passwords, plaintext credentials pulled from camera configs, and password spraying against Outlook Web Access.
- Post-exploitation is commodity tooling. Impacket, CrackMapExec, BloodHound, Responder, renamed procdump, GOST and ProxyChains, which means generic detections for these tools pay off directly.
- Phishing-resistant MFA on webmail and VPN is the first fix. The advisory names it for all externally facing services alongside patching against the KEV catalogue.
Who they are (names and aliases)
MITRE ATT&CK tracks the group as Ember Bear (G1003), a Russian state-sponsored cyber espionage group active since at least 2020 and linked to the GRU 161st Specialist Training Center (Unit 29155). The joint advisory of 5 September 2024 states that Unit 29155 is separate from other GRU units such as 26165 and 74455, and lists the industry names below while noting that they do not map one to one to US government tracking. Microsoft assesses that Cadet Blizzard is linked to the GRU but separate from Forest Blizzard and Seashell Blizzard.
| Name | Tracked by | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| GRU Unit 29155 (161st Specialist Training Center) | FBI, CISA, NSA and partners (AA24-249A) | Government attribution |
| Cadet Blizzard (earlier DEV-0586) | Microsoft | Named in June 2023 |
| Ember Bear, Bleeding Bear | Vendors, ATT&CK | ATT&CK primary name is Ember Bear |
| UNC2589, Frozenvista, UAC-0056 | Vendors and CERT-UA, listed in the advisory and ATT&CK | UAC-0056 is also listed by ATT&CK under Saint Bear, so check context |
For comparison with the other GRU units, see the APT28 (Fancy Bear) Threat Actor Profile (Unit 26165) and the Sandworm Threat Actor Profile (Unit 74455).
Targeting and motivation
- Regions: NATO members in Europe and North America, EU countries, Ukraine, and countries in Latin America, Central America, Central Asia and Asia (AA24-249A).
- Sectors: government services, financial services, transportation systems, energy and healthcare. Microsoft adds IT providers, law enforcement, NGOs and emergency services, and notes repeated supply chain compromise of IT providers.
- Scale of reconnaissance: the advisory reports more than 14,000 domain scanning instances across at least 26 NATO members.
- Motivation: the advisory says that since early 2022 the primary focus has been disrupting efforts to aid Ukraine, through espionage, sabotage and reputational harm: data theft, leaks, defacements and destruction.
Tactics and techniques (MITRE ATT&CK)
All techniques below are mapped to G1003 in ATT&CK v20 and match behaviour described in AA24-249A or Microsoft's 2023 report.
| Tactic | Technique | How it shows up |
|---|---|---|
| Reconnaissance | T1595.001 Scanning IP Blocks; T1595.002 Vulnerability Scanning | Nmap, MASSCAN, Acunetix, WPScan; Shodan to find IoT devices |
| Initial access | T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application | Confluence CVE-2022-26134 and CVE-2022-26138, Sophos Firewall CVE-2022-3236, Dahua CVE-2021-33044 and CVE-2021-33045; Microsoft adds Confluence CVE-2021-26084 and Exchange CVE-2022-41040 |
| Initial access | T1078.001 Default Accounts; T1133 External Remote Services | Default passwords on internet-exposed IP cameras; VPNs for access and persistence |
| Initial access | T1195 Supply Chain Compromise | IT providers and software developers serving the real targets |
| Credential access | T1110.003 Password Spraying; T1110 Brute Force | Spraying Outlook Web Access; su-bruteforce against local Linux users |
| Credential access | T1003.001 LSASS Memory; T1003.002 Security Account Manager; T1003.004 LSA Secrets | procdump renamed dump64.exe, reg save of hives, Impacket secretsdump |
| Credential access | T1552.001 Credentials In Files | Camera configuration dumps containing plaintext credentials |
| Lateral movement | T1550.002 Pass the Hash; T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation; T1021 Remote Services | Impacket psexec and WMI with hashes |
| Persistence | T1505.003 Web Shell; T1053.005 Scheduled Task | P.A.S., reGeorg and p0wnyshell web shells; remote scheduled tasks |
| Command and control | T1572 Protocol Tunneling; T1090.003 Multi-hop Proxy; T1071.004 DNS; T1095 Non-Application Layer Protocol | ProxyChains, GOST renamed to java, dnscat/2 and Iodine DNS tunnels, Netcat |
| Collection, exfiltration | T1114 Email Collection; T1125 Video Capture; T1567.002 Exfiltration to Cloud Storage | PowerShell mailbox export requests; camera images; Rclone to MEGA |
| Stealth | T1036 Masquerading; T1070.004 File Deletion | Renamed tools; deletion of lateral movement artefacts |
| Impact | T1561.002 Disk Structure Wipe; T1491.002 External Defacement | WhisperGate MBR wiping; defacement of Ukrainian websites |
How they abuse identities and credentials
Almost every stage of a Unit 29155 intrusion described in the advisory turns on a credential that was default, reused, single-factor or stored in clear text.
| Credential weakness | How the actor uses it | Fix |
|---|---|---|
| Default device passwords | Logs in to exposed IP cameras found via Shodan, then dumps configs with plaintext credentials | Change all default credentials, remove cameras from the internet, put them behind a VPN or gateway. See the IP Camera and CCTV Security Guide |
| Single-factor webmail | Password sprays OWA, then exports mailboxes with PowerShell | Phishing-resistant MFA on OWA and VPN; restrict the Mailbox Import Export role to a small admin group and alert on its use |
| Reusable NTLM hashes | Dumps LSASS, SAM and LSA secrets, then moves with pass the hash over SMB and WMI | Credential Guard, LSASS protection, unique local admin passwords with Windows LAPS, block NTLM where possible |
| Service and machine secrets on hosts | LSA secrets hold service account passwords; SSH keys are collected from target systems | Move service accounts to gMSA, vault SSH keys and rotate them after any intrusion. See the Group Managed Service Accounts (gMSA) Guide and the SSH Key Management Guide |
| Trusted third parties | Compromises IT providers to reach their customers | Scope and monitor provider accounts, require MFA and time-bound access for vendor sessions |
- Treat Linux too: su-bruteforce targets local accounts, so enforce lockout via PAM faillock and alert on repeated su failures.
- After eviction, rotate everything that was reachable: domain credentials exposed to secretsdump, service account passwords, SSH keys and device passwords. Rebuilding hosts without rotating these leaves the actor a way back.
Notable incidents
| Date | Event | Source |
|---|---|---|
| From 2020 | Group active, per ATT&CK and the advisory | ATT&CK G1003; AA24-249A |
| 13 January 2022 | WhisperGate deployed against Ukrainian government organisations; website defacements the same month | AA24-249A; Microsoft, 14 June 2023 |
| 2022 to 2023 | Leaks of stolen data through the Free Civilian forum; a Telegram channel of the same name appears in February 2023 | Microsoft |
| 2022 to 2024 | Scanning across at least 26 NATO members; intrusions into government, energy, transport, finance and healthcare | AA24-249A |
| 5 September 2024 | Joint advisory AA24-249A published by FBI, CISA, NSA and international partners | AA24-249A |
Detection and defence
Detection signals
| Signal | Where to look | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Many failed OWA sign-ins across accounts from VPN or Tor exit addresses | IIS logs on Exchange, identity provider logs | The group used IVPN, SurfShark and Tor for anonymity |
| New-MailboxExportRequest or other mailbox export activity | Exchange admin audit log | Rarely legitimate outside eDiscovery |
| procdump or a renamed binary opening LSASS; reg save of SAM, SYSTEM or SECURITY | Sysmon Event ID 10 and 1, EDR | Microsoft cites dump64.exe as a seen name |
| Impacket patterns: services created with random names, WMI child processes writing output to ADMIN$ | Event ID 7045, 4688, EDR | The advisory asks defenders to detect Impacket, PsExec and WMI |
| Long or high-volume DNS queries to one domain | DNS logs | dnscat/2 and Iodine tunnelling; see the DNS Security Guide |
| Processes named java or other common names making outbound tunnels from servers | EDR, NetFlow | GOST renamed to match legitimate software |
| Rclone or large uploads to MEGA | Proxy logs, EDR | Exfiltration to cloud storage |
| Attempts to write to the MBR or volume boot record | EDR, controlled folder access events | WhisperGate behaviour |
Hardening plan
- Week 1: patch or isolate every internet-facing system listed in the advisory, starting with entries in CISA's KEV catalogue; take IP cameras off the internet and change their default passwords.
- Weeks 2 to 4: require phishing-resistant MFA on webmail, VPN and remote access; block legacy authentication; alert on password spray patterns.
- Weeks 4 to 8: enable Credential Guard and LSASS protection in audit mode, then enforce; deploy Windows LAPS; turn on attack surface reduction rules that block process creation from PsExec and WMI, and controlled folder access, testing on a pilot ring with rollback to audit mode if business applications fail.
- Quarter 1: segment networks to limit lateral movement; restrict PowerShell to current versions with logging; send logs to a protected remote store; review third-party provider access.
- Resilience: keep offline, tested backups and a wiper response runbook. See the Wiper Attack Response Playbook.
Metrics
- External services without phishing-resistant MFA: target zero.
- Internet-facing KEV vulnerabilities past due date: target zero.
- Internet-exposed cameras and IoT devices: target zero, verified by external scans each month.
- Hosts with Credential Guard or LSASS protection: above 95%.
- Time to restore a critical system from offline backup: tested at least twice a year.
Framework mapping
| Framework | Reference | Relevance |
|---|---|---|
| NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 | IA-2 Identification and Authentication, AC-7 Unsuccessful Logon Attempts, IA-5 Authenticator Management | MFA, spraying and default credentials |
| NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 | RA-5 Vulnerability Monitoring and Scanning, SI-2 Flaw Remediation | Closing the exploited CVEs |
| NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 | SI-4 System Monitoring, AU-9 Protection of Audit Information | Detecting tools and protecting logs |
| NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 | CP-9 System Backup, CP-10 System Recovery and Reconstitution | Recovering from wiper attacks |
| NIST CSF 2.0 | PR.AA-03, PR.DS-11, RC.RP-01 | Authentication, backups, executing the recovery plan |
Practitioner checklist
- Check exposure to every CVE in AA24-249A and confirm patches are applied on Confluence, Exchange, Sophos and Dahua devices.
- Remove IP cameras from direct internet exposure and change every default password.
- Enforce phishing-resistant MFA on OWA, VPN and remote access, and alert on spraying.
- Audit who holds the Exchange Mailbox Import Export role and alert on export requests.
- Deploy detections for Impacket, renamed procdump, GOST, ProxyChains, DNS tunnels and Rclone.
- Move service accounts to gMSA and vault SSH keys; plan rotation after any intrusion.
- Enable controlled folder access and keep offline backups to limit wiper damage.
- Review access held by IT providers and require MFA and time-bound sessions.
Standards and references
- FBI, CISA, NSA and partners: Russian Military Cyber Actors Target U.S. and Global Critical Infrastructure (AA24-249A)
- MITRE ATT&CK: Ember Bear (G1003)
- MITRE ATT&CK: WhisperGate (S0689)
- Microsoft Threat Intelligence: Cadet Blizzard emerges as a novel and distinct Russian threat actor
- MITRE ATT&CK: Disk Wipe: Disk Structure Wipe
- MITRE ATT&CK: Valid Accounts: Default Accounts
- CISA: Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog
Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: Wiper Malware Guide · Russia State Cyber Operations Guide · Gamaredon Group Threat Actor Profile Guide · Cyber Warfare Guide · Threat Actor Groups Guide