Most cloud privilege is never checked out of a vault: it sits in standing role assignments, permission sets and service account bindings that nobody has used for months. This template is a ready-to-issue request for proposal for the part of privileged access that lives inside cloud control planes: cloud infrastructure entitlement management (CIEM) and just-in-time (JIT) elevation of cloud roles, for people, workloads and AI agents. It deliberately leaves out password vaulting, session recording and endpoint privilege, which belong in the PAM RFP Template; use the two together, with matching requirement IDs, if you are buying both. It is vendor-neutral and written for cloud security, IAM and platform engineering leads and their procurement teams. For what the market offers, read the CIEM Buyers Guide and the Cloud PAM and Just in Time Access buyer's guide.
How to use this template
- Replace text in square brackets, such as [Organisation], [cloud providers] and [number], with your own details. Delete requirements that do not apply to your estate.
- Each requirement has an ID (for example CPA-JIT-03) and a type: M mandatory (pass or fail), S scored (0 to 5, weighted) or I informational.
- Weights, windows and volumes in brackets are illustrative, not benchmarks. Set them from your own risk and scale before issue and do not change them after responses arrive.
- Before writing weights, find out what your cloud providers already give you natively (see the table under Implementation guidance). Score bidders on what they add across providers, not on features you already own.
- Issue sections 1 to 8 to bidders. The Implementation guidance section is for your evaluation panel only.
- Scope boundary: if a requirement is about storing, rotating or brokering a credential, it belongs in the PAM RFP; if it is about which cloud permissions an identity holds and for how long, it belongs here.
1. Purpose and scope
[Organisation] invites proposals for a platform and services that discover, analyse and right-size cloud entitlements, and that replace standing cloud administrator access with time-bound, approved elevation. The outcome sought is that every human, workload and agent identity in [cloud providers] holds only the permissions it uses, and that high-risk permissions are held only for the duration of an approved task.
- In scope: [cloud providers and number of accounts, subscriptions or projects]; workforce identities federated into those clouds; IAM roles, permission sets, role assignments and service accounts; workload identities including [Kubernetes service accounts, serverless functions, CI/CD pipeline roles]; [AI agent identities]; cross-account and cross-tenant trust relationships; [named SaaS control planes, if required].
- Out of scope: credential vaulting and rotation, session brokering and recording, endpoint privilege and remote vendor access (see the PAM RFP Template); cloud misconfiguration scanning beyond identity (see the CIEM vs CSPM comparison); joiner, mover and leaver for workforce applications (IGA).
- Drivers: [standing Owner or AdministratorAccess assignments]; [audit finding on unused cloud permissions]; [service accounts with no owner]; [incident lessons].
- Contract term: [three] years with an option to extend by [two] years.
2. Organisation background and current state
| Item | [Organisation] value |
|---|---|
| Cloud providers and tenancy structure | [providers]; [number] accounts, subscriptions or projects; [organisation, management group or folder hierarchy in use] |
| Workforce identity provider and federation | [IdP]; [federation method into each cloud] |
| Human identities with cloud access | [number] engineers, [number] administrators, [number] third parties |
| Machine identities known | [number] roles, service accounts and managed identities, or "unknown, discovery required" |
| Long-lived cloud credentials | [number] access keys or service account keys; [policy on their use] |
| Kubernetes | [number] clusters; [how cloud IAM maps to cluster RBAC] |
| Native tooling already enabled | [provider-native access analysis, recommender and JIT features in use] |
| Existing PAM, IGA and SIEM | [products], so that integration requirements can be scored |
| Hosting and data constraints | [SaaS acceptable / regional data residency / self-hosted collectors] |
3. Instructions to bidders
- Timeline: RFP issued [date]; clarifications by [date]; responses due [date, time, time zone]; proof of concept [dates]; decision [date].
- Single point of contact: [name, email].
- Response scale per requirement: available now; available with configuration; relies on a provider-native feature (name it); custom development; roadmap (committed date); not supported. Roadmap answers score zero unless the date is contractually committed.
- Per-provider answers: answer every requirement separately for each of [cloud providers]. A capability demonstrated in one cloud does not count for another.
- Permissions you need from us: list every IAM permission, role or API scope the platform requires in each cloud, separately for read-only analysis and for any remediation or JIT function.
- Architecture: include a diagram showing collectors, where entitlement and activity data is stored, and every connection into [Organisation] tenants.
4. Functional requirements
4.1 Discovery and inventory of identities and entitlements
| ID | Requirement | Type |
|---|---|---|
| CPA-DSC-01 | Discovers all human, workload and federated identities across every account, subscription and project in section 2, including identities assumed through cross-account or cross-tenant trust. | M |
| CPA-DSC-02 | Resolves effective permissions by combining identity policies, resource policies, inherited assignments, group membership, permission boundaries and organisation-level guardrails; explain the method per provider. | M |
| CPA-DSC-03 | Maps federated workforce users back to their identity provider identity, so that one person is shown once across clouds. | S |
| CPA-DSC-04 | Identifies long-lived credentials (access keys, service account keys, client secrets) attached to cloud identities, with age and last use. | M |
| CPA-DSC-05 | Maps cloud IAM to Kubernetes cluster permissions where workloads or users reach clusters through cloud identity. | S |
| CPA-DSC-06 | Assigns or imports an accountable owner for every machine and agent identity, and reports identities with no owner. | M |
See the Cross-Account Access Guide.
4.2 Entitlement analysis and right-sizing
| ID | Requirement | Type |
|---|---|---|
| CPA-ANL-01 | Compares granted permissions with permissions used over a configurable observation window of [90] days, at service and action level, per identity. | M |
| CPA-ANL-02 | Reports unused roles, unused credentials and unused permissions as separate finding types, with the window and the data source used. | M |
| CPA-ANL-03 | Generates a least-privilege replacement policy or role from observed use, in the provider's native policy format, for human review before applying. | S |
| CPA-ANL-04 | Identifies privilege escalation paths, such as permission to attach policies, create keys for another identity, or impersonate a more privileged service account. | M |
| CPA-ANL-05 | Flags external and public access granted through resource policies and trust relationships. | S |
| CPA-ANL-06 | Explains each finding: which policy grants the permission, through which path, and what would change if it were removed. | S |
| CPA-ANL-07 | Handles infrequent but legitimate use (quarterly jobs, disaster recovery roles) through exceptions with an owner and expiry, not by silently ignoring them. | S |
The attacker techniques these requirements reduce include MITRE ATT&CK T1078.004 Cloud Accounts and T1098.003 Additional Cloud Roles. See the Cloud IAM Review Checklist.
4.3 Just-in-time cloud privilege and zero standing access
| ID | Requirement | Type |
|---|---|---|
| CPA-JIT-01 | Grants time-bound cloud roles or permission sets for console and CLI use in each of [cloud providers], removed automatically at expiry, with no permanent assignment left behind. | M |
| CPA-JIT-02 | Configures, per role, the maximum duration, eligible requesters, approvers, whether justification and a ticket reference are required, and whether approvers must justify approval. | M |
| CPA-JIT-03 | Supports multi-level approval for the highest-risk roles, and prevents a requester from approving their own request. | S |
| CPA-JIT-04 | Requires step-up, phishing-resistant authentication at the identity provider at request time. | S |
| CPA-JIT-05 | Scopes a grant to a named account, subscription, project or resource, not only to a whole tenant. | S |
| CPA-JIT-06 | Lets an approver or administrator revoke an active grant immediately, with the revocation taking effect in the cloud provider and recorded. | M |
| CPA-JIT-07 | Supports request and approval from chat and IT service management tools [named], and from the CLI, so engineers are not pushed to keep standing access. | S |
| CPA-JIT-08 | Reports standing privileged cloud assignments remaining, per provider and per role, as a trendable metric. | M |
| CPA-JIT-09 | Leaves documented emergency access working if the platform is unavailable; describe how break-glass identities are excluded from automated removal. | M |
See the JIT Access Guide and the Break-Glass Account Guide.
4.4 Workload, pipeline and AI agent entitlements
| ID | Requirement | Type |
|---|---|---|
| CPA-NHI-01 | Applies sections 4.1 and 4.2 to service accounts, managed identities, workload roles and pipeline roles with the same depth as human identities. | M |
| CPA-NHI-02 | Recommends replacing long-lived keys with workload identity federation where the workload platform supports it, and tracks progress. | S |
| CPA-NHI-03 | Supports time-bound, task-scoped elevation for automation and AI agents through an API, with human approval for defined actions and attribution to the agent and its owner. | S |
| CPA-NHI-04 | Detects a machine identity being used from an unexpected location, workload or interactive session. | S |
See the Workload Identity Federation Guide.
4.5 Remediation, workflow and integration
| ID | Requirement | Type |
|---|---|---|
| CPA-REM-01 | Remediates through [ticket, pull request to infrastructure as code, or direct change], selectable per finding type; direct change requires approval and is reversible. | S |
| CPA-REM-02 | Writes right-sized policies back to [Terraform or other infrastructure as code] so that the next deployment does not reintroduce the removed permission. | S |
| CPA-REM-03 | Streams findings, grants, approvals and revocations to [SIEM] in near real time, with the cloud provider's own audit event identifiers. | M |
| CPA-REM-04 | Feeds cloud entitlements to [IGA platform] for access reviews, or runs reviews itself with closed-loop revocation. | S |
| CPA-REM-05 | Shares identity and requirement IDs with the [PAM platform] where both coexist; describe the boundary. | I |
See the CIEM vs IGA comparison.
5. Security of the platform
A CIEM or cloud JIT platform holds read access to every tenant and, if it remediates or grants roles, write access to IAM itself. Its own security is scored as heavily as its features.
| ID | Requirement | Type |
|---|---|---|
| CPA-SEC-01 | Analysis functions run with read-only permissions; write permissions for JIT or remediation are separate, scoped and can be withheld without losing analysis. | M |
| CPA-SEC-02 | Connects to each cloud through federation or short-lived credentials, not long-lived keys; list any exceptions. | M |
| CPA-SEC-03 | Platform administrators authenticate through [Organisation] SSO with phishing-resistant MFA; administrative roles are granular and separated from approver roles. | M |
| CPA-SEC-04 | Describe bidder staff access to customer entitlement data, how it is approved and logged, and data residency options. | M |
| CPA-SEC-05 | Provide a current independent assurance report, a [SIG or CAIQ] response and a published vulnerability disclosure policy. | M |
| CPA-SEC-06 | Full export of findings, policies and grant history at exit, and certified deletion. | M |
6. Implementation, services and support
- Phasing: propose phases with acceptance criteria, for example [read-only discovery in all clouds; right-size human administrator roles; JIT for production administrator roles; machine and pipeline identities; agents].
- Change safety: describe how permission removals are tested before production, how long changes are observed, and how a removal is rolled back.
- Team and references: named roles and [two or three] references of similar scale, at least one running JIT in more than one cloud.
- Support: severity targets, and how fast the platform supports new provider services and actions after their release.
7. Commercials
| Cost element | What to state |
|---|---|
| Licence metric | Per cloud account, per workload, per identity or per resource; how machine identities and agents are counted |
| Modules | Which section 4 requirements need separate modules (JIT, remediation, Kubernetes, SaaS) |
| Provider costs | Any cloud provider charges the platform causes (log ingestion, API calls, provider premium tiers it depends on) |
| Implementation | Fixed price or day rate with estimated days by phase |
| Growth, renewal and exit | Price for [growth percentage] more accounts or identities; renewal cap; exit charges |
8. Evaluation method and proof of concept
| Criterion | Weight | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| Entitlement discovery and analysis (4.1, 4.2) | [30%] | Proof of concept against a seeded test estate |
| Just-in-time privilege (4.3) | [20%] | Proof of concept scored by engineers who will use it |
| Machine and agent identities (4.4) | [15%] | Proof of concept |
| Platform security (5) | [15%] | Permission list, architecture review, assurance reports |
| Life-cycle cost (7) | [20%] | Section 7 including provider costs |
Scores use 0 to 5: 0 not met; 1 roadmap only; 3 met with configuration; 5 met fully and demonstrated in every cloud in scope. The proof of concept of [number] weeks covers at minimum:
- Discovery in a test estate seeded with known findings: an unused administrator role, an unused access key, a service account that can impersonate a more privileged one, a cross-account trust to an unknown account. Record what was found and missed.
- Generation of a least-privilege replacement policy for a role with [90] days of activity, reviewed by the owning team.
- JIT elevation to a production role in each cloud from the console and CLI, with approval, step-up authentication, expiry and early revocation, and the events visible in [SIEM].
- Platform unavailability: show that break-glass access still works and that no grant outlives its expiry.
- Remediation by pull request to infrastructure as code, then confirm the next deployment does not restore the removed permission.
Implementation guidance
This section is for the evaluation panel, not for bidders.
Know what the clouds already provide
Each major provider documents native capabilities in this area. Providers are listed alphabetically. Bidders should be scored on cross-cloud correlation, depth of analysis, workflow and machine identity coverage, not on repeating these features.
| Provider | Native entitlement analysis | Native time-bound elevation |
|---|---|---|
| Amazon Web Services | IAM Access Analyzer reports external access, internal access and unused access findings; unused access findings cover unused roles, unused IAM user access keys and passwords, and unused permissions within a usage window. | Temporary elevated access for IAM Identity Center is delivered through AWS-validated partner solutions; AWS also recommends setting up emergency console access. |
| Google Cloud | IAM role recommendations suggest removing or replacing roles based on up to 90 days of permission use, for users, service accounts and other principals. | Privileged Access Manager uses entitlements (eligible principals, roles, maximum duration, optional approvers and justification) and grants that are revoked when the duration ends, logged in Cloud Audit Logs. |
| Microsoft Azure | Privileged Identity Management access reviews confirm that users still need Azure resource and Microsoft Entra roles. | Privileged Identity Management provides eligible and time-bound assignments with activation, approval, justification and MFA on activation, plus downloadable audit history. |
Availability: provider features carry their own licence or tier requirements (for example, Microsoft documents that PIM requires Microsoft Entra ID Governance licensing, and Google documents that multi-level approval in Privileged Access Manager is a Preview feature tied to Security Command Center tiers). Confirm current terms with each provider. Native features as described in provider documentation, checked November 2026.
Panel notes
- Seed the test estate: CPA-DSC-02 and CPA-ANL-04 separate strong from weak bids. Build findings you know are there and count what each bidder misses.
- Measure the observation window honestly: a 90-day window will flag roles used only quarterly. Score CPA-ANL-07 on how exceptions are handled, not on how many findings are produced.
- Let engineers score JIT: if requesting a role is slower than keeping standing access, standing access returns. Weight CPA-JIT-07 by the score of the people who will use it.
- Control proof-of-concept access: grant read-only roles for analysis and a separate, expiring role for JIT testing, and remove both at the end.
- Agree the PAM boundary early: decide which tool owns cloud console JIT if your PAM platform also offers it, so that CPA-JIT-01 and PAM-JIT-02 in the PAM RFP do not create two approval paths.
Metrics to set as acceptance criteria
- Standing privileged cloud assignments, per provider, against the baseline from discovery.
- Percentage of granted permissions used in the observation window, for human and for machine identities.
- Long-lived cloud keys remaining, and their median age.
- Machine and agent identities with a named owner.
- Median time from JIT request to grant, and percentage of grants revoked early or expiring unused.
Framework mapping
| Requirement group | NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 | NIST CSF 2.0 | ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A |
|---|---|---|---|
| Discovery and ownership (4.1, 4.4) | AC-2, AC-6(5) | PR.AA-01 | A.5.16 Identity management |
| Right-sizing and reviews (4.2, 4.5) | AC-6, AC-6(7) | PR.AA-05 | A.5.18 Access rights |
| Just-in-time privilege (4.3) | AC-2(2), AC-6(5) | PR.AA-05 | A.8.2 Privileged access rights |
| Logging and detection (4.3, 4.5) | AC-6(9), AU-6 | DE.CM-03 | A.8.15 Logging |
Standards and references
- NIST: SP 800-53 Rev. 5 Security and Privacy Controls
- NIST: Cybersecurity Framework 2.0
- MITRE ATT&CK: T1098.003 Additional Cloud Roles
- AWS: IAM Access Analyzer findings
- Google Cloud: Privileged Access Manager overview
- Microsoft Learn: What is Microsoft Entra Privileged Identity Management
Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: PAM RFP Template · CIEM Buyers Guide · CIEM Health Check · Cloud PAM and CIEM Guide · Security Vendor Evaluation and RFP Guide