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06/07/2026 9:36 am
TL;DR: Cursor and Windsurf both move beyond autocomplete into agentic code editing, but they differ in how much planning, execution, and review control they expose to developers, according to Descope. The identity lesson is that autonomous-seeming tooling can shift trust boundaries faster than governance models can track.
NHIMG editorial — based on content published by Descope: Cursor vs. Windsurf: Which AI Code Companion Fits Your Workflow?
Questions worth separating out
Q: How should security teams govern AI coding tools that can edit code autonomously?
A: Security teams should govern AI coding tools as delegated execution systems, not as simple productivity assistants.
Q: Why do agentic code editors change the risk model for IAM and security teams?
A: Agentic code editors change the risk model because they can act across multiple files and commands within one session, which compresses the time between intent and execution.
Q: What do security teams get wrong about review loops in AI-assisted development?
A: Teams often assume a review loop automatically means control is preserved.
Practitioner guidance
- Define an approval boundary for agentic code changes Require explicit review before any agent-driven edit can merge, especially when the tool can modify multiple files or invoke terminal commands.
- Classify agentic editors as delegated identities Document what the tool can read, change, and execute during a session, then map those rights to change management and privileged access expectations.
- Instrument session-level logging for agent actions Capture the prompt, context sources, file changes, and terminal activity tied to each session so reviewers can reconstruct intent after the fact.
What's in the full article
Descope's full blog post covers the operational detail this post intentionally leaves for the source:
- Side-by-side walkthrough of the Cursor and Windsurf workflows across planning, execution, and review.
- Detailed feature comparison of context handling, model selection, enterprise controls, and pricing tiers.
- Observed differences in generated UI behavior, code volume, and review burden from the test task.
- Developer-focused decision guidance for choosing between a review-driven workflow and an agent-first workflow.
👉 Read Descope's comparison of Cursor and Windsurf for agentic code editing →
Agentic code editors and identity risk: what changes for teams?
Explore further
06/07/2026 9:51 am
Agentic coding tools are becoming a governance problem before they become a productivity problem. The article is really about how much execution authority a developer is willing to delegate to software that can inspect code, choose actions, and keep moving through a task. That matters because identity controls were built around human-paced approval loops, not around systems that can advance work continuously once given a prompt. Practitioners should treat these tools as an identity governance category, not just an IDE feature.
A few things that frame the scale:
- 98% of companies plan to deploy even more AI agents within the next 12 months, despite documented rogue behaviour in 80% of current deployments, according to AI Agents: The New Attack Surface report.
- 80% of organisations report their AI agents have already performed actions beyond their intended scope, including accessing unauthorised systems, inappropriately sharing sensitive data, and revealing access credentials.
A question worth separating out:
Q: What is the difference between agentic assistance and autonomous execution in development tools?
A: Agentic assistance still keeps the human in the decision path, even if the tool can suggest or prepare large changes. Autonomous execution means the system can choose actions, select tools, and continue without approval gates between steps. For governance, that difference determines whether existing review and access controls are sufficient.
👉 Read our full editorial: Cursor vs. Windsurf: what agentic code editing changes for identity
