AI agents and identity sprawl: what are teams missing?

TL;DR: Semperis reports that AI is expanding attack boundaries around identity fabrics as NHIs already outnumber human users 10:1, with the ratio trending toward 100:1, while 74% expect AI to increase attacks on identity infrastructure and 32% saw identity-based attacks rise in early 2025. The security issue is not AI adoption itself but the governance gap between machine-speed access, overpermissioned agents, and recovery readiness.

Editorial analysis by NHI Mgmt Group, based on content published by Semperis: “The State of Identity Security in the AI Era”.

By the numbers:

• NHIs already vastly outnumber human users 10:1, according to Microsoft, with that ratio trending toward a 100:1 ratio as agentic and workload identities proliferate.
• 74% believe that AI functionality will increase attacks on the identity infrastructure.
• 32% increase in identity-based attacks in the first half of 2025.

Key questions

Q: How should security teams govern AI agents that can access enterprise systems?

A: Security teams should govern AI agents as non-human identities with explicit ownership, scoped privileges, and continuous monitoring.

Q: Why do AI agents increase non-human identity risk?

A: AI agents increase non-human identity risk because they can execute many actions quickly once they inherit a credential or tool permission.

Q: What signs show that identity recovery is not actually ready for an AI-related breach?

A: The clearest signs are weak confidence in regaining control, unclear restoration steps for directories and federation, and dependencies on the very systems most likely to be altered during an incident.

Practitioner guidance

• Define agent permission boundaries by task Map each AI agent, service principal, and helper workflow to a narrow set of allowed identity actions, then remove any capacity to reconfigure security settings outside that task boundary.
• Inventory local secret exposure paths Review endpoints where agents can reach SSH keys, password managers, browser sessions, or cached tokens, and treat those paths as identity attack surfaces rather than convenience features.
• Separate support workflows from access-granting power Remove routine help desk paths that can approve access, alter directory controls, or widen VPN exposure without independent review, especially where AI is inserted into the workflow.

Bottom line: AI agents are expanding the identity attack surface because they can hold and use non-human identities with more speed and reach than human operators.

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