TL;DR: MCP's biggest security risk is a missing trust boundary, because Willow says authentication, authorization, and audit enforcement are left to implementers. That pushes control into each server and makes identity, logging, and access paths harder to govern consistently.
Editorial analysis by NHI Mgmt Group, based on content published by Willow: “The 10 MCP Security Risks Enterprise Teams Are Underestimating”.
By the numbers:
- Research shows 43% of MCP servers vulnerable to command injection.
Key questions
Q: Why do insecure credential handling patterns persist in MCP environments?
A: They persist because the protocol gives teams no shared credential lifecycle model, so each server invents its own storage and passing method.
Q: What are the signs that MCP governance is failing?
A: Common signs include agents reaching systems outside their intended workflow, incomplete audit trails for tool use, and data retrieval that cannot be tied back to a clear business purpose.
Q: What breaks when MCP deployments rely on the protocol for security boundaries?
A: The control boundary breaks first, because MCP does not supply native authentication or capability enforcement.
Practitioner guidance
- Define a central MCP authorisation policy Require a single policy layer for which agents, tools, and data sources may connect, rather than leaving each server to implement its own access rules.
- Block secrets from configuration files Move API keys and tokens into managed secret storage, and reject deployments that store credentials in world-readable config files or process-visible environment variables.
- Validate every tool schema field Scan parameter names, default values, type definitions, and non-standard fields, then remove anything that can influence model behaviour outside an approved contract.
Bottom line: MCP's core risk is not one bug but a missing trust boundary, because the protocol leaves authentication, authorization, and audit enforcement to implementers.
Glossary terms: Model Context Protocol, Tool Poisoning, Shadow MCP Server, Cross-Agent Privilege Escalation
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MCP introduces a governance failure before it introduces a technical one: the protocol delegates authentication and enforcement to implementers, so the trust boundary is external to the standard itself. That means two MCP deployments can behave radically differently even when they appear to use the same protocol. Enterprises should read this as an access governance problem, not just a protocol adoption question.
A few things that frame the scale:
- 24,008 unique secrets were exposed in MCP configuration files in 2025 alone, the protocol's first year of widespread adoption, according to the State of Secrets Sprawl 2026.
- 19% of organisations give AI systems dramatically more access than human employees, nearly one in five granting unrestricted privilege, according to the 2026 Infrastructure Identity Survey.
A question worth separating out:
Q: How should security teams respond when AI agents can change each other's configuration?
A: They should treat cross-agent writes as privileged actions and separate configuration stores by trust zone. When one agent can alter another agent's tools or server list, the issue is not convenience but delegation risk, so approval and integrity controls need to sit on the configuration path.
👉 Read our full editorial: Ten MCP security risks that enterprise teams keep underestimating