Topic starter
22/07/2026 4:36 pm
TL;DR: Multi-agent systems challenge static IAM and PAM models by planning, calling tools, and delegating work at runtime, which creates non-linear chains of custody and weak accountability, according to Apono. Standing access becomes the wrong default when authority can change mid-task and persist longer than the action itself.
Editorial analysis by NHI Mgmt Group, based on content published by Apono: “Are Multi-Agent Systems the Next Frontier for Identity Security?”.
By the numbers:
- 82% of executives plan to adopt AI agents within the next three years, according to Apono.
Key questions
Q: What breaks when multi-agent systems rely on standing access?
A: Standing access breaks the assumption that identity is enough context for authorization.
Q: Why do agentic AI workflows create new IAM risk compared with traditional automation?
A: Traditional automation usually follows fixed rules and predictable paths, so its access model is easier to review.
Q: How can teams tell whether agentic access controls are actually working?
A: Look for evidence that every privileged action is logged with actor type, target resource, and policy decision, and that denied requests are being blocked before execution.
Practitioner guidance
- Adopt task-scoped authorization Grant agent access only for a specific task, resource, and approval path, then expire it when the work completes.
- Implement Zero Standing Privilege for agents Replace persistent agent entitlements with just-in-time elevation for sensitive or destructive actions so authority exists only during the active workflow.
- Track full agent provenance Record the initiating human or workflow, the agent that acted, the tools called, the permissions granted, and whether approval was required before execution.
Bottom line: Multi-agent systems expose a mismatch between static entitlement models and runtime delegation, which makes standing access a poor fit for agentic workflows.
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This topic was modified 5 days ago by NHI Mgmt Group
22/07/2026 4:42 pm
Standing access is the wrong mental model for agentic identity: multi-agent systems invalidate the assumption that privileges can be safely pre-provisioned because the access path is created at runtime, not at onboarding. That assumption works for stable human roles and many NHIs, but it breaks when an actor can decide mid-task to seek more authority or delegate to another agent. The implication is that identity programmes must stop treating access as durable state and start treating it as ephemeral execution context.
A few things that frame the scale:
- Gartner predicts that by 2028, 33% of enterprise software applications will include agentic AI, up from less than 1% in 2024, and that 15% of day-to-day work decisions will be made autonomously.
A question worth separating out:
Q: Should organisations use zero standing privilege for agentic access?
A: Yes, when the agent only needs access for a specific action or session. Zero standing privilege reduces persistent exposure and limits what a compromised or misused agent can touch. It works best when paired with approval, logging, and immediate revocation after the task completes.
👉 Read our full editorial: Multi-agent systems are exposing IAM assumptions about standing access
This post was modified 5 days ago by NHI Mgmt Group