Topic starter
06/11/2026 6:37 pm
TL;DR: C1.ai argues that identity security was built for a stable world of known users, known apps and tracked service accounts, but agentic AI has expanded the surface area into messy, runtime-driven identity creation. The old NHI playbook is necessary yet insufficient because agents need authorization per action, not only lifecycle control.
Editorial analysis by NHI Mgmt Group, based on content published by C1.ai: “Identity Security Was Built for a World That No Longer Exists”.
Key questions
Q: How should identity teams govern agents that act on behalf of employees?
A: Treat them as delegated access with a lifecycle, not as a one-time exception.
Q: Why do periodic access reviews miss fast-changing agentic access?
A: Periodic access reviews miss fast-changing agentic access because an AI agent can gain, use and relinquish tool permissions, tokens and data scope between review cycles.
Q: How can organisations tell whether their NHI controls are keeping up with AI agents?
A: Look for controls that can prove who requested access, which tool was used, what scope was granted, and whether the identity could be revoked cleanly.
Practitioner guidance
- Map identities at the point of use Identify where identities are created outside traditional provisioning flows and where actions begin before registration catches up.
- Separate delegated authority from standalone access Document which agents act on behalf of a human and which operate as independent non-human identities, then govern those two cases differently.
- Move approval logic closer to execution Require sensitive actions to pass a runtime authorisation check instead of relying only on initial enrolment or role assignment.
Bottom line: Identity programmes built around a stable catalog of users and service accounts are being outgrown by runtime identity creation.
What's in the full article
C1.ai's full blog post covers the operational detail this post intentionally leaves for the source:
- How the vendor maps human, service account and agent identities across an environment
- The practical distinction between delegated authorization and standalone agent identity
- The runtime governance model used to decide access where actions happen
- How discovery, ownership and enforcement are sequenced in the vendor's approach
👉 Read C1.ai's analysis of runtime identity governance for agentic AI →
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06/11/2026 6:41 pm
Identity security is moving from inventory management to execution governance. The old model was built around known identities, known applications and controlled provisioning queues. Agentic systems weaken that model because creation can happen faster than registration, and use can begin before a normal review process has any meaningful visibility. Practitioners should treat runtime enforcement as the primary governance layer, not a refinement of the old one.
A few things that frame the scale:
- 80% of identity breaches involved compromised non-human identities such as service accounts and API keys, according to the Ultimate Guide to NHIs.
- Only 5.7% of organisations have full visibility into their service accounts, according to the Ultimate Guide to NHIs.
A question worth separating out:
Q: How should security teams discover shadow AI agents in the enterprise?
A: Use endpoint artefacts first. Look for agent directories, service definitions, local ports, and process names that prove the software is installed and active. Network traffic alone is too ambiguous because legitimate browser and API activity can look identical to agent behaviour. Discovery should produce an inventory of where the agent runs, what it can reach, and whether it is sanctioned.
👉 Read our full editorial: Identity security must shift from orchestration to runtime