TL;DR: API security has become a core governance problem because APIs now sit in critical business flows, expose hidden attack surfaces, and fail in areas like discovery, authorization, and business logic, according to Pynt. For IAM and NHI teams, the lesson is that Zero Trust only works when every API call, token, and delegated access path is continuously governed.
NHIMG editorial — based on content published by Pynt: why API security became a critical concern in 2023
By the numbers:
- Only 5.7% of organisations have full visibility into their service accounts.
- 96% of organisations store secrets outside of secrets managers in vulnerable locations including code, config files, and CI/CD tools.
- 90% of IT leaders say properly managing NHIs is essential for a successful zero-trust implementation.
Questions worth separating out
Q: How should security teams govern cloud workloads that rely on service accounts and API keys?
A: Treat workload identities as first-class governed assets, not implementation details.
Q: Why do business logic flaws create more risk than simple injection bugs in APIs?
A: Because business logic flaws abuse intended behaviour rather than broken syntax, they can pass authentication, encryption, and many scanners without raising alarms.
Q: How can security teams tell whether API discovery is actually working?
A: API discovery is working when newly created or changed endpoints appear quickly in the inventory, each has an accountable owner, and sensitive-data handling is visible in the same record.
Practitioner guidance
- Map APIs to owning identities Build a live inventory that links each API endpoint to its owner, authentication method, token type, and the non-human identities permitted to use it.
- Test for object and function-level authorisation failures Add BOLA and BFLA scenarios to your security testing so teams validate whether callers can alter object references or reach privileged functions outside their role.
- Enforce request-time policy checks Apply continuous authorisation checks at the API layer for service accounts, tokens, and session context.
What's in the full article
Pynt's full article covers the operational detail this post intentionally leaves for the source:
- Expanded examples of API attack patterns, including injection, authentication bypass, and denial of service.
- The article's discussion of discovery challenges across fast-changing API estates and hidden endpoints.
- The source's explanation of how shift-left testing is applied to API security in development pipelines.
- Coverage of LLM-related API risk, including prompt injection and abuse of dynamic requests.
👉 Read Pynt's analysis of why API security became a top concern →
API security and zero trust: what IAM teams need to know?
Explore further
API governance debt is now an identity problem disguised as application risk. The article correctly shows that organisations cannot secure what they cannot discover, and discovery failures create blind spots for service identities, tokens, and delegated access. That is where API security intersects directly with IAM and NHI governance: if the API estate is incomplete, so is the identity estate that depends on it. Practitioners should treat API discovery as part of identity inventory management, not as a separate application task.
A question worth separating out:
Q: What should teams do when APIs support LLM workflows or agentic automation?
A: They should segment those APIs as high-risk interfaces and tighten logging, request validation, and rate controls. LLM-connected APIs can amplify small access mistakes into data leakage or denial-of-service, so identity scope and runtime monitoring need to be stricter than for ordinary application traffic.
👉 Read our full editorial: API security is now an identity and governance problem