App store control: is it actually reducing mobile app risk?

TL;DR: App store review can create a false sense of security because many mobile threats emerge after installation at runtime, including tampering, credential theft, bot abuse, API exploitation, and transaction manipulation, according to Approov. The security model has to move beyond distribution gates to controls that actually govern app behaviour in the field.

Editorial analysis by NHI Mgmt Group, based on content published by Approov: “App fairness, security, and a healthier mobile ecosystem”.

Key questions

Q: What breaks when mobile app review is treated as the main security control?

A: The control fails at runtime.

Q: Why do mobile apps create identity and API risk after installation?

A: Because the attacker often works through legitimate channels.

Q: How do security teams judge whether shared mobile controls are actually working?

A: Look for fewer workarounds, faster task completion, lower support friction, and consistent handoff behaviour across shifts and locations.

Practitioner guidance

• Separate distribution approval from runtime assurance Assess app store review as a release control, then require independent checks for runtime integrity, token handling, API authorisation, and fraud resistance.
• Harden backend trust in mobile authentication flows Treat the app as an untrusted client unless requests prove integrity through device posture, attestation, and server-side validation of high-risk actions.
• Measure abuse that occurs after installation Track credential theft attempts, account takeover indicators, API scraping, and bot-driven transaction abuse separately from store rejection metrics.

Bottom line: App store governance and mobile security are not the same thing, because distribution review cannot control what happens after installation.

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