Topic starter
11/11/2026 6:00 pm
TL;DR: Tool calls in agentic coding harnesses can look consistent across network and harness logs while still hiding the real endpoint behaviour, according to Origin. That leaves defenders with partial evidence unless they correlate execution telemetry from the machine itself.
Editorial analysis by NHI Mgmt Group, based on content published by Origin: “Mind the Gap: Highlighting Telemetry Gaps in Agentic Coding Harnesses”.
Key questions
Q: Why can harness logs disagree with system telemetry?
A: Harness logs can disagree with system telemetry when the agent’s own execution record is incomplete, delayed, or written at a different layer than the operating system or cloud collector.
Q: How should teams implement observability for AI agents that call tools and APIs?
A: Teams should instrument the agent path end to end, from user input through retrieval, tool execution, and final response.
Q: How do agent tool calls differ from endpoint execution?
A: Agent tool calls are the instructions the model issues through the harness, while endpoint execution is the action the machine actually performs after wrappers, shell expansion, and local runtime handling.
Practitioner guidance
- Define endpoint evidence as the authoritative record Require machine-level telemetry for agent actions that can change files, processes, or system state, and do not treat harness logs as sufficient proof on their own.
- Correlate tool calls to expanded execution Store the original tool request, the wrapped command, and the child process result together so investigators can compare intent, wrapper behaviour, and endpoint execution.
- Detect trace drift between layers Alert when the tool name, command text, or file effect differs between network records, in-process logs, and endpoint telemetry for the same session.
Bottom line: Agentic coding traces can look complete while still missing the actual endpoint effect because wrappers and runtime expansion change what gets executed.
Glossary terms: Agentic Harness, PowerShell Wrapper, Tool Call ID, Endpoint Telemetry
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11/11/2026 6:07 pm
Agent telemetry is not evidence until it is cross-layer verified: the article shows that network logs, harness logs, and endpoint telemetry can all describe the same turn yet still disagree on the real action. That is a governance problem, not a logging problem. Security teams that use agent traces for investigations or approvals need independent endpoint corroboration, because an in-process emitter is never a neutral witness.
A few things that frame the scale:
- Claude Code-assisted commits leaked secrets at a rate of 3.2%, more than double the human-only baseline of 1.5%, with peaks reaching 31 secrets per 1,000 commits in August 2025, according to the State of Secrets Sprawl 2026.
A question worth separating out:
Q: What signs show an agent trace has drifted?
A: An agent trace has drifted when the recorded steps no longer match the live execution path, such as missing tool calls, unexpected branches, changed prompt context, or wrapper processes that appear without a corresponding recorded action. Other signs include gaps in timestamps, inconsistent tool arguments, and a final outcome that cannot be reconstructed from the trace alone.
👉 Read our full editorial: Agentic coding traces can misreport what the endpoint ran