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Could DMARC on Mid-Atlantic domains still allow spoofing?

 

(@nhi-mgmt-group)
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Joined: 2 years ago
Posts: 20225
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TL;DR: Only 44% of the Mid-Atlantic's top domains reached DMARC enforcement, according to Red Sift. Partial policies still leave spoofed email viable unless sender discovery is finished and reject becomes the default.

Editorial analysis by NHI Mgmt Group, based on content published by Red Sift: “Only 44% of the Mid-Atlantic's top organizations block spoofed email”.

By the numbers:

  • Red Sift analyzed 700 domains across seven Mid-Atlantic states and the District of Columbia.
  • Only 309 of 700 domains, or 44%, reached full DMARC enforcement.
  • 191 domains, or 27.3%, still run p=none policies that monitor but do not block spoofed email.

Key questions

Q: Why do organisations stay exposed after SPF and DKIM are in place?

A: SPF and DKIM reduce impersonation risk, but they do not stop spoofing on their own if the domain owner has not moved DMARC to enforcement.

Q: How should security teams prioritise DMARC rollout across a large organisation?

A: Start with the domains that carry the highest trust value and fraud impact, such as finance, procurement, government correspondence and healthcare communications.

Q: What breaks when DMARC is not enforced for brand email?

A: Without DMARC enforcement, mailbox providers can still deliver or partially trust spoofed mail that appears to come from your domain.

Practitioner guidance

  • Inventory every legitimate sender Build a complete list of business systems, third parties and cloud services that send mail on behalf of the domain before moving enforcement forward.
  • Move p=none domains to reject Prioritise domains already collecting DMARC reports and convert them from monitoring to blocking once alignment issues are resolved.
  • Shorten quarantine as a transition state Use quarantine only as a temporary step while sender exceptions are validated, then complete the move to enforcement rather than letting the state persist.

Bottom line: The Mid-Atlantic study shows that many top organisations have not completed the last mile of email authentication even when DMARC is already present.

Glossary terms: DMARC, P=none Policy, Quarantine Policy, Email Spoofing

Explore further

View Full Forum →  |  NHI Foundation Course →  |  Our Services →  |  Read the full analysis →


This topic was modified 1 week ago by NHI Mgmt Group

   
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(@mr-nhi)
Member Moderator
Joined: 6 months ago
Posts: 20715
 

DMARC execution debt is the real control gap: the article shows that many organisations have published records but not finished enforcement. That is a governance failure, not a technical mystery, because p=none and long quarantine states create a false sense of completion while spoofing remains possible. Practitioners should treat incomplete DMARC rollout as a lifecycle issue, not a one-time configuration task.

A question worth separating out:

Q: What should teams do when quarantine seems close enough to reject?

A: Treat quarantine as a short transition state, not a permanent compromise. If the domain is already aligned and reporting cleanly, finish the policy change to reject so receivers can stop accepting spoofed mail rather than merely handling it more cautiously.

👉 Read our full editorial: Mid-Atlantic email authentication still leaves spoofing gaps


This post was modified 1 week ago by NHI Mgmt Group

   
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