Topic starter
25/10/2026 11:08 am
TL;DR: Zero Trust for operational technology has to be adapted to safety, uptime, and legacy constraints, according to Xage Security. OT environments need controls that preserve process continuity while still limiting access at the asset level.
Editorial analysis by NHI Mgmt Group, based on content published by Xage Security: “Navigating the New 2026 US Government Interagency Guidance: Adapting Zero Trust for OT with Xage Security”.
Key questions
Q: Why does weak third-party software oversight increase risk in converged IT and OT environments?
A: Weak third-party oversight increases risk because modern operational environments depend on external software, device stacks, and remote connectivity that can become attack paths.
Q: How should security teams handle third-party remote access to industrial systems?
A: Treat third-party access as a governed exception, not a permanent support channel.
Q: What breaks when Zero Trust is applied to OT without safety-aware design?
A: Zero Trust fails in OT when it assumes enterprise-style flexibility.
Practitioner guidance
- Define OT trust boundaries by asset and protocol Document which PLCs, RTUs, edge systems, and control applications need separate policy zones, then enforce access based on process criticality and protocol sensitivity rather than broad network membership.
- Separate OT identity from enterprise directory paths Review where Active Directory or other shared identity systems are used directly in OT, then break cross-domain coupling with layered ICAM, MFA, and tightly scoped roles.
- Restrict third-party remote access to controlled entry points Require hardened termination hosts, session recording, and JIT access for vendors and contractors so that remote support does not become a standing lateral-movement path.
Bottom line: The article argues that OT Zero Trust has to be adapted to safety, uptime, and legacy constraints rather than copied from enterprise networks.
Glossary terms: Operational Technology Zero Trust, Identity-aware Segmentation, Just-in-Time Access Request, Agentless enforcement
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This topic was modified 7 days ago by NHI Mgmt Group
27/10/2026 7:17 pm
Zero Trust in OT is now an operational governance problem, not a theoretical architecture debate. The article reflects a broader shift in critical infrastructure security: the question is no longer whether to remove implicit trust, but how to do it without interrupting production or safety systems. That changes the role of identity, segmentation, and remote access from optional hardening to baseline control design. Practitioners should treat OT Zero Trust as a resilience programme with safety constraints.
A few things that frame the scale:
- 90% of IT leaders say properly managing NHIs is essential for a successful zero-trust implementation, according to the Ultimate Guide to NHIs.
A question worth separating out:
Q: What is the difference between agent-based and agentless Zero Trust in OT?
A: Agent-based Zero Trust relies on software installed on endpoints to enforce or observe policy, while agentless Zero Trust applies controls outside the device, usually at gateways or access layers. In OT, agentless designs are often safer because many legacy systems cannot tolerate added software, latency, or warranty risk.
👉 Read our full editorial: Zero trust for OT now hinges on identity, segmentation and resilience
This post was modified 7 days ago by NHI Mgmt Group