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20/08/2026 5:33 pm
TL;DR: OWASP’s 2025 Top 10 reflects a structural shift in application risk, with security misconfiguration rising and software supply chain failures widening the attack surface, according to Sprocket Security. Static scans and point-in-time reviews are no longer enough when change itself now drives exposure.
NHIMG editorial — based on content published by Sprocket Security: OWASP Top 10 2025: Moving Beyond Code
Questions worth separating out
Q: How should security teams handle misconfiguration risk in dynamic cloud environments?
A: Treat misconfiguration as a continuous exposure problem, not a one-time hardening task.
Q: Why do code injection flaws matter to IAM and NHI governance?
A: They matter because injected code often runs under a trusted application or pipeline identity.
Q: What do security teams get wrong about configuration drift?
A: They often treat drift as a compliance exception instead of a live access risk.
Practitioner guidance
- Implement continuous misconfiguration validation Run continuous testing against cloud, container, and API configurations so privilege drift and exposed settings are detected as the environment changes, not weeks later in review cycles.
- Review service account and pipeline identity scope Map CI/CD, registry, and deployment identities to the minimum permissions they actually need, then remove long-lived secrets and stale access paths.
- Tie supply chain controls to runtime exposure Go beyond dependency scanning by validating whether third-party components or build tools can be abused in the assembled system, especially where they inherit privileged access.
What's in the full article
Sprocket Security's full analysis covers the operational detail this post intentionally leaves for the source:
- How continuous penetration testing validates exploitable misconfigurations in live environments
- Examples of dependency flaws chained with configuration drift to create real attack paths
- Why static scanning and SBOM review miss assembled-system exposure
- How teams can prioritise findings based on attacker reach rather than policy labels
👉 Read Sprocket Security's analysis of OWASP Top 10 2025 and continuous testing →
OWASP 2025 misconfiguration and supply chain risk: are controls keeping up?
Explore further
20/08/2026 6:20 pm
Misconfiguration is now an identity governance issue, not only an appsec issue. The article rightly shows that an overly permissive IAM policy or forgotten debug flag can create exploitable exposure overnight. When identity and configuration drift interact, the control failure is governance, not just hygiene. Practitioners should treat runtime access review and configuration validation as a single control plane.
A question worth separating out:
Q: How should organisations reduce risk from trusted build and deployment identities?
A: Limit those identities to narrowly scoped, task-specific permissions and remove any secrets that persist beyond the job they support. Then monitor for unexpected privilege expansion in CI/CD, package registries, and deployment automation. The goal is to prevent a pipeline trust path from becoming a production access path.
👉 Read our full editorial: OWASP 2025 shifts appsec toward misconfiguration and supply chains
