TL;DR: The first NIST post-quantum standards still leave migration focused on where RSA and elliptic-curve cryptography protects key exchange, signatures and certificates, Fortanix reports. Crypto inventory has to come first, because teams cannot plan replacement order or crypto-agility until those dependencies are mapped.
Editorial analysis by NHI Mgmt Group, based on content published by Fortanix: “PQC Algorithms Explained: ML-KEM, ML-DSA, and SLH-DSA”.
Key questions
Q: Why does quantum risk matter before quantum computers can actually break RSA?
A: Quantum risk matters early because attackers can record encrypted traffic today and decrypt it later once enough quantum capability exists.
Q: What breaks when organisations delay post-quantum migration for sovereign certificate authorities?
A: Delaying migration leaves the certificate authority hierarchy dependent on algorithms that may not survive future quantum attacks.
Q: How should teams prioritise data for post-quantum cryptography migration?
A: Prioritise data by confidentiality lifetime, replaceability, and exposure spread.
Practitioner guidance
- Map every RSA and elliptic-curve dependency Inventory systems, applications, data stores, certificates, and signing workflows so you know where vulnerable public-key cryptography remains in use.
- Classify cryptographic use by business criticality Rank high-value data, long-lived trust anchors, and externally exposed services first so migration work follows exposure, not convenience.
- Build a crypto-agility roadmap Plan for algorithm substitution without rebuilding applications, and require vendors to explain how they will support transitions to NIST-approved PQC standards.
Bottom line: The central risk is not only future quantum capability but the current inability to map where vulnerable public-key cryptography still protects trust and data.
Glossary terms: Post-Quantum Cryptography, Crypto-Agility, Harvest now, decrypt later, Machine Identity
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Crypto migration is an identity governance problem, not just a cryptography refresh. The article shows that PQC readiness depends on knowing where certificates, signatures, and key exchange are used across systems. That is governance work because ownership, dependency mapping, and lifecycle control determine whether migration can happen at all. Where machine identity and PKI are involved, discovery has to cover service accounts, certificates, and signing flows together. Practitioners should treat cryptographic inventory as part of identity governance, not a side exercise.
A question worth separating out:
Q: What is the difference between ML-KEM and ML-DSA in PQC planning?
A: ML-KEM is for key establishment, where two parties derive a shared secret over a public channel. ML-DSA is for signatures, where systems need authentication, integrity, and non-repudiation. Teams should not treat them as substitutes, because they protect different trust functions in the cryptographic stack.
👉 Read our full editorial: PQC migration depends on inventory before quantum threats mature