Topic starter
24/10/2026 8:51 pm
TL;DR: Recovery costs remain above $2.73 million and 72% of organisations faced ransomware attempts in 2025, with Ordr's data showing disruption and exfiltration drive much of the impact. Containment has to limit lateral movement and preserve recovery paths before production access collapses.
Editorial analysis by NHI Mgmt Group, based on content published by Ordr: “Ransomware Statistics”.
By the numbers:
- A ransomware attack occurs approximately every 11 seconds globally.
- 72% of organizations experienced ransomware attempts in 2025.
- The average ransom payment in 2025 reached $1.82 million.
Key questions
Q: Why do ransomware attacks keep creating such expensive recovery and business disruption costs?
A: Ransomware creates high cost because it stops operations, forces recovery work, and can still leave organisations without full data restoration even after payment.
Q: What are the signs that ransomware containment controls are not working?
A: Warning signs include multiple systems being infected from one initial compromise, critical services going offline for extended periods, and recovery taking days rather than hours.
Q: What breaks when privileged access is too broad in a ransomware attack?
A: Broad privileged access turns a single endpoint compromise into cross-server movement, credential harvesting, and recovery disruption.
Practitioner guidance
- Constrain lateral movement paths Map the identities, service accounts and device relationships that let ransomware spread across production, backup and management networks, then remove unnecessary trust links.
- Reduce standing privilege before incidents Review privileged accounts, remote admin access and service credentials that remain valid outside active tasks, and retire persistent access wherever possible.
- Segment critical operational environments Separate medical, production and business systems so an intrusion in one zone cannot automatically reach high-value data stores or recovery infrastructure.
Bottom line: Ransomware economics now hinge on access scope, operational disruption and data theft, not just the encryption payload itself.
Glossary terms: Ransomware-as-a-Service, Blast Radius, Data Exfiltration, Standing Privilege
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This topic was modified 7 days ago by NHI Mgmt Group
25/10/2026 11:12 am
Ransomware is increasingly an identity problem wrapped inside a malware event. The article’s own numbers show that exfiltration, downtime and recovery cost dominate the economics, which means the attacker’s leverage comes from access, not just payload delivery. That shifts the governance question toward who can move laterally, who can reach sensitive systems, and which accounts remain usable after first contact. Practitioners should treat identity scope as part of ransomware preparedness, not a separate programme.
A few things that frame the scale:
- Half of 1,100 global security leaders surveyed by CrowdStrike believed they were very well prepared for ransomware, yet 78% of their organisations had been attacked in the past year.
A question worth separating out:
Q: How should organisations prepare for ransomware in high-downtime sectors?
A: Organisations in healthcare, manufacturing and similar environments should build response plans around continuity, not only restoration. That means identifying which systems must stay operational, limiting the identities that can reach them, and testing segmentation under failure conditions. If critical services cannot be isolated from the rest of the estate, recovery will remain slow and expensive.
👉 Read our full editorial: Ransomware economics show downtime and exfiltration drive impact
This post was modified 7 days ago by NHI Mgmt Group