TL;DR: Ransomware victim counts and new group counts stayed high, Black Kite found, even as incident-response data showed payment rates dropping to 26%, 23%, and 19% in data-exfiltration-only cases. Extortion now depends less on a single recovery decision and more on how far exposed identities, data, and leverage can reach.
Editorial analysis by NHI Mgmt Group, based on content published by Black Kite: “Ransomware Payments”.
By the numbers:
- Black Kite observed 7,551 ransomware victims during the reporting period.
- Black Kite observed 61 new ransomware groups during the reporting period.
- Coveware reported that 26% of organizations paid ransomware demands in Q2 2025.
Key questions
Q: Should organisations prioritise containment or prevention for ransomware?
A: They should do both, but containment deserves priority when exposure is unavoidable.
A: Warning signs include ransom notes appearing on a public website, repeated pressure on supply chain partners, and threat actors using multiple channels to widen exposure beyond the affected environment.
Q: What breaks when a ransomware actor can steal data without encrypting systems?
A: The response model breaks because the organisation loses the clear containment logic that encryption creates.
Practitioner guidance
- Reduce standing access across SaaS and enterprise applications Review accounts, tokens, and delegated access that can reach sensitive data stores or cross-tenant resources.
- Segment high-value data paths from everyday operator access Separate administrative access, service access, and business-user access so that one compromised identity cannot both discover data and execute disruptive actions.
- Prioritise third-party access offboarding and token revocation Track external accounts, API tokens, and partner integrations through the full access lifecycle, including rapid revocation when relationships end or risk changes.
Bottom line: Ransomware is increasingly an access and disclosure problem as much as an encryption problem, which changes what defenders must protect first.
Glossary terms: Data Extortion, Extortion Leverage, Standing Access Exposure, Payment Conversion
Explore further
View Full Forum → | NHI Foundation Course → | Our Services → | Read the full analysis →
Data-exfiltration-only extortion has become a governance problem, not just a ransomware variant. Once attackers can steal data through a single exposed access path, the organisation is negotiating over disclosure risk rather than system availability alone. That changes the control boundary for identity teams because compromised service accounts, SaaS tokens, and third-party access can create the leverage. Practitioners should treat access scope as part of extortion resilience, not only incident response.
A question worth separating out:
Q: Should security teams treat ransomware payment rates as a measure of programme effectiveness?
A: No. Payment rates reflect the attacker’s leverage, the victim’s circumstances, insurer involvement, and legal advice, not just security maturity. A falling payment rate does not mean the environment is safer if exposed identities, overprivileged access, or unmanaged third-party connections still allow theft at scale.
👉 Read our full editorial: Ransomware economics shifted as payments fell and stakes rose