Topic starter
25/10/2026 11:06 am
TL;DR: Scam reporting fragmentation is weakening fraud response and trust, with Feedzai tying the problem to gaps that stop victim complaints from becoming coordinated intelligence. Fraud teams need intake and routing that turn reports into usable signals for detection, remediation, and cross-sector coordination.
Editorial analysis by NHI Mgmt Group, based on content published by Feedzai: “What’s Unifying Americans in Polarizing Times? Scams.”.
By the numbers:
- 98% of American adults believe scams pose a national security threat to the country.
- 75% of victims do not report scams because they are uncertain it would make a difference.
- 55% of scam victims first report their experience to a bank.
Key questions
Q: Why do scam reporting gaps make fraud defence less effective?
A: Reporting gaps reduce the sample of observable attacks, which weakens pattern recognition and hides repeat offenders.
Q: What breaks when victims do not know where to report a scam?
A: When victims do not know where to report, the organisation loses early warning, loses linkage between cases, and loses the opportunity to intervene before further transfers or replays occur.
Q: How should financial institutions handle scam reports so they actually improve fraud defence?
A: Financial institutions should treat scam reports as structured intelligence, not just service cases.
Practitioner guidance
- Standardise scam intake and classification Create a single reporting taxonomy for scams across branches, call centres, apps, and fraud queues so every complaint becomes usable intelligence instead of a standalone case.
- Route victim reports into transaction monitoring Link complaint intake directly to fraud monitoring so reports can be correlated with payment patterns, mule behaviour, and repeated beneficiary exposure.
- Reduce reporting friction for victims Simplify the path from customer complaint to formal report, including clear instructions for where to escalate and what evidence to capture.
Bottom line: Scams now sit at the intersection of fraud, trust, and national security, so the governance response has to be broader than transaction monitoring alone.
Glossary terms: Authorised Push Payment Fraud, Detection Gap, Fraud Intelligence Loop, Cross-Boundary Signal Sharing
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This topic was modified 7 days ago by NHI Mgmt Group
27/10/2026 7:16 pm
Scam reporting fragmentation is now a control failure, not a communications issue. When 75% of victims do not report and many do not know where to report, the system is failing at intake, routing, and intelligence conversion. That means fraud teams are operating with incomplete evidence while offenders iterate quickly across institutions. The governance gap is the absence of a shared reporting fabric, not simply a lack of public awareness. Practitioners should treat reporting design as part of fraud control architecture.
A few things that frame the scale:
- Organisations maintain an average of 6 distinct secrets manager instances, creating fragmentation that undermines centralised control, according to the State of Secrets in AppSec.
A question worth separating out:
Q: Should banks or law enforcement own scam response accountability?
A: Neither side can own it alone. Banks usually see the first signal, while law enforcement and regulators can broaden the response and support systemic action. Effective governance assigns banks responsibility for intake, evidence quality, and immediate containment, while external agencies receive standardised reports that support larger pattern disruption.
👉 Read our full editorial: Scam reporting gaps are weakening fraud response and trust
This post was modified 7 days ago by NHI Mgmt Group