Topic starter
11/08/2026 3:13 pm
TL;DR: A study across more than 13,000 detection rules and 2.5 million log sources found enterprises could technically cover 90% of MITRE ATT&CK techniques, yet their actual coverage was only 22%, with 10% of deployed rules broken, according to Gurucul. The real constraint is routing, normalization, and enrichment, not raw telemetry volume.
Editorial analysis by NHI Mgmt Group, based on content published by Gurucul: “Most enterprises already collect enough data to cover 90% of the MITRE ATT&CK framework. They cover 22%.”.
By the numbers:
- Their actual coverage was 22%.
- The same study found 10% of deployed rules were broken and would never fire under any circumstances.
Key questions
Q: What breaks when SIEM teams treat coverage as a volume problem?
A: They often end up paying for more telemetry while still missing detections, because the bottleneck is parsing, normalization, routing, and enrichment.
Q: Why do high-volume logs often create more risk than value in SIEM programmes?
A: High-volume sources are not inherently bad, but they become risky when they push teams to disable useful telemetry or overload expensive analytics tiers.
Q: How do security teams know if SIEM coverage is actually working?
A: They verify the path from source to rule, not just the rule itself.
Practitioner guidance
- Define detection-driven routing policies Map every major source to the detections, models, and hunts that actually consume it, then route only the necessary fields into the analytics tier.
- Preserve high-signal identity telemetry Keep process creation with command line, authentication, cloud control plane, and service-account activity available for analytics rather than excluding them on cost grounds.
- Enrich events before they reach detection logic Inject identity, asset, and threat context at the pipeline layer so analysts and models receive records that are already usable for correlation.
Bottom line: The central SIEM problem in this article is not how much data exists, but how much of it is converted into usable detection content.
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This topic was modified 3 hours ago by NHI Mgmt Group
11/08/2026 3:27 pm
Coverage debt is the hidden control failure in many SIEM programmes: teams count ingested volume, but they do not govern whether that volume can actually support the detections they rely on. The result is a false sense of visibility that survives renewal discussions but fails under intrusion pressure. For identity-heavy environments, the gap is especially dangerous because authentication, service account, and cloud activity often become the first signals of compromise. The practitioner conclusion is simple: measure the coverage output of the pipeline, not just the size of the pipe.
A question worth separating out:
Q: How should IAM and SOC teams use identity telemetry more effectively in detection engineering?
A: They should enrich authentication, service-account, and cloud identity events before those records reach the analytics layer. That allows detections to work with ownership, entitlement, and risk context instead of raw usernames and IPs. When identity data is structured early, it becomes a stronger control signal for both insider and external threat detection.
👉 Read our full editorial: SIEM detection gaps are a routing problem, not a data problem
This post was modified 3 hours ago by NHI Mgmt Group