Topic starter
21/10/2026 7:00 pm
TL;DR: Broader VPN sessions can give remote users more reach than task-specific access needs, according to DNSFilter. Remote access governance has to map entitlements to applications and services instead of inheriting network-wide permissions.
Editorial analysis by NHI Mgmt Group, based on content published by DNSFilter: “VPN Replacement Guide: How to Choose the Right VPN Alternative”.
Key questions
Q: Why do broad VPN sessions increase lateral movement risk?
A: Broad VPN sessions increase risk because authentication often places the user onto a network segment rather than a single resource.
Q: How do security teams know whether remote admin access is too broad?
A: Look for accounts that can reach servers, stop services, or manage recovery tooling without task-specific approval or expiry.
Q: What breaks when legacy VPNs are used as the default remote access model?
A: Legacy VPNs break down when they are asked to do too much.
Practitioner guidance
- Define access by use case first Separate private-application access, internet traffic protection and DNS-layer policy enforcement before selecting replacement controls.
- Remove broad network placement from remote sessions Limit remote users to the specific applications or services they need, rather than placing them onto a larger internal network segment.
- Make device posture part of the access decision Check operating system status, endpoint protection and management state before and during access so that identity alone does not open the session.
Bottom line: Legacy VPNs are increasingly a poor fit for hybrid work because they grant broad network reach where application-scoped access is usually enough.
Glossary terms: Zero Trust Network, Split Tunnelling, Network Segmentation, Device Posture
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This topic was modified 4 days ago by NHI Mgmt Group
23/10/2026 12:48 am
VPN replacement is really an access governance problem, not a transport problem. The article shows that the old model bundles encryption, routing and entitlement into one control, which is why it becomes brittle as remote work and cloud use expand. In practice, the security decision is no longer whether to keep a tunnel, but where identity-aware authorization should begin and end.
A question worth separating out:
Q: When should organisations use zero trust network access instead of a full VPN?
A: Organisations should use zero trust network access when the real need is access to specific private applications, not entry to the internal network. If users mainly need application-level access and off-network policy enforcement, ZTNA fits better than a full VPN. If the goal is only encrypted internet traffic, a separate control is usually more appropriate.
👉 Read our full editorial: VPN replacement requires narrower access, not broader tunnels
This post was modified 4 days ago by NHI Mgmt Group