TL;DR: Water and wastewater utilities are still carrying elevated cyber risk, with less than 25% of U.S. utilities completing an annual cyber risk assessment, according to Nozomi Networks. Operational resilience now depends on knowing what is exposed and responding around constraints, not on patching alone.
Editorial analysis by NHI Mgmt Group, based on content published by Nozomi Networks: “How to Strengthen Cybersecurity Resilience for Public Water and Wastewater Utilities”.
By the numbers:
- Less than 25% of water and wastewater utilities in the U.S. undergo an annual cyber risk assessment, according to Nozomi Networks.
- Water and wastewater utilities are one of 16 critical national infrastructure segments, according to Nozomi Networks.
Key questions
Q: Why do weak segmentation and insecure remote access increase risk in water utilities?
A: They collapse the boundary between ordinary administrative connectivity and control-system access.
Q: How should water utilities prioritise OT remediation when patching is limited?
A: Prioritise by exploitability, exposure, asset criticality and process impact rather than by vulnerability count alone.
A: Security teams lose the ability to prioritise risk against current exposure.
Practitioner guidance
- Build a real-time OT asset inventory Track every connected device, protocol and remote path across plants, stations and field sites so exposure is visible before prioritisation starts.
- Baselining normal communications Use passive monitoring to establish normal traffic, then flag new services, unusual protocols and unexpected remote connections for review.
- Prioritise remediation by operational impact Rank vulnerabilities by exploitability, exposure and process criticality, and move unsupported assets, default credentials and internet-facing services to the top of the queue.
Bottom line: Water and wastewater utilities face a compounded risk model because connectivity expands access paths while operational constraints limit conventional patching.
Glossary terms: Operational Technology, Human-Machine Interface, Programmable Logic Controller, Segmentation
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OT resilience now depends on governing access paths, not just hardening devices. Water utilities cannot treat remote access, shared credentials and vendor connectivity as secondary issues because those are often the paths that lead into HMIs and PLCs. In a converged environment, identity controls and segmentation determine whether a routine connection becomes an operational hazard. Practitioners should govern every trust path into OT as a resilience control, not an IT convenience.
A question worth separating out:
Q: When should an OT security programme move from detection to recovery planning?
A: It should do both from the start, but recovery planning becomes essential as soon as critical systems cannot be freely patched or rebooted. In water and wastewater, response and restoration must be rehearsed before an incident because availability and safety constraints limit real-time improvisation. Teams need tested backups, role clarity and evidence-handling procedures.
👉 Read our full editorial: Water utility cyber resilience now hinges on visibility and response