TL;DR: Critical infrastructure is becoming easier to reach because exposed OT assets, weak default credentials and edge-device vulnerabilities are widening the attack surface, according to runZero. Operators need visibility into what is internet-facing, what credentials still work and how lateral movement could unfold.
Editorial analysis by NHI Mgmt Group, based on content published by runZero: “Thinking critically about Critical Infrastructure”.
Key questions
Q: Why do default credentials remain dangerous in operational technology?
A: Default credentials are dangerous because they often survive device deployment, are reused across fleets, and create a predictable foothold for attackers.
Q: How does IT/OT convergence create lateral movement paths?
A: IT/OT convergence creates lateral movement paths when connected business systems, plant systems, shared networks, and remote access channels let an attacker move from a less protected IT foothold into OT control assets.
Q: How do exposed PLCs increase critical infrastructure risk?
A: Exposed PLCs increase risk because they move industrial control from a protected operational boundary into a reachable attack surface.
Practitioner guidance
- Audit external reachability for PLCs and edge devices Identify every PLC, router, VPN endpoint and remote access path that can be reached from the internet or from adjacent IT segments, then remove or constrain anything unnecessary.
- Eliminate default and shared credentials on OT assets Search for factory passwords, reused administrator accounts and weak local logins on industrial assets and edge appliances, then rotate or remove them before they are exposed to attackers.
- Validate segmentation with attack path analysis Model how a foothold in IT or an exposed appliance could pivot into OT, and test whether current segmentation actually blocks those movements.
Bottom line: Critical infrastructure exposure is increasingly created by the combination of reachable assets, weak credentials and blurred IT/OT boundaries.
Glossary terms: Operational Technology, Programmable Logic Controller, IT/OT Convergence, Default Credential
Explore further
View Full Forum → | NHI Foundation Course → | Our Services → | Read the full analysis →
Critical infrastructure exposure is now an identity problem as much as a network problem. The central failure mode is not only that systems are online, but that operators often cannot tell which paths are authenticated, which are default, and which should no longer exist. In converged environments, that creates a governance gap between asset visibility and access assurance. Practitioners should treat exposed OT as governed access surface, not just unmanaged infrastructure.
A question worth separating out:
Q: What is the best way to validate segmentation in OT environments?
A: The best way to validate segmentation in OT environments is to test from real source zones and confirm only intended reachable services and administrative routes are open. Use deny-by-default rules, packet and flow checks, route review, and controlled probe traffic to verify that engineering stations, HMIs, historians, and remote admin paths cannot reach unrelated zones.
👉 Read our full editorial: Exposed OT assets and weak credentials expand the attack surface