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02/09/2026 1:29 pm
TL;DR: Active Directory hardening remains a layered identity problem because lower-privilege account exposure, excessive privileges, and configuration drift create the attack paths adversaries keep using, according to IS Decisions. The practical takeaway is that MFA, service account governance, tiering, protocol removal, and continuous monitoring have to work together, because single controls do not neutralise directory abuse.
NHIMG editorial — based on content published by IS Decisions: Active Directory hardening and the practical controls that reduce identity exposure
By the numbers:
- Only 5.7% of organisations have full visibility into their service accounts.
- 71% of NHIs are not rotated within recommended time frames, increasing the risk of compromise over time.
- 97% of NHIs carry excessive privileges, increasing unauthorised access and broadening the attack surface.
Questions worth separating out
Q: What breaks when Active Directory is left with too many privileged paths?
A: The directory stops behaving like a controlled identity system and starts behaving like a privilege graph.
Q: Why do legacy authentication protocols make AD harder to defend?
A: Legacy protocols preserve attack paths that modern identity controls are meant to close.
Q: How should security teams prioritise AD hardening work?
A: Start with identity exposure, then move to privilege containment, and finally address monitoring and drift.
Practitioner guidance
- Inventory and purge undocumented accounts Find user and service accounts that no longer have a clear owner, purpose, or session pattern, then remove or disable them before they become escalation footholds.
- Tier privileged access and block cross-tier logon paths Keep higher-tier credentials off lower-tier systems, limit admin logon only to approved workstations and domain controllers, and review every exception as a governance issue.
- Remove legacy authentication paths and audit certificate services Disable NTLM where possible, move service accounts to managed rotation, and treat ADCS as an escalation surface that requires explicit auditing and review.
What's in the full article
IS Decisions' full guide covers the operational detail this post intentionally leaves for the source:
- Step-by-step Active Directory hardening actions for user accounts, service accounts, and domain controllers.
- Specific guidance on LDAP, SMB v3, NTLM, Kerberos, PAWs, gMSAs, and ADCS controls.
- Examples of open-source tools and community resources used to map hidden attack paths.
- Practical notes on where third-party identity overlays fit into an AD hardening programme.
👉 Read IS Decisions' guide to Active Directory hardening and identity exposure →
Active Directory hardening: are your controls keeping up with privilege?
Explore further
02/09/2026 1:30 pm
Active Directory hardening is really about controlling identity exposure before it becomes privilege escalation. The article is correct to treat lower-privilege accounts as the first layer of weakness and excessive privilege as the next layer. That sequence mirrors what we see across enterprise identity programmes: once directory exposure is broad, every control after that has to work harder to contain the blast radius.
A few things that frame the scale:
- Only 5.7% of organisations have full visibility into their service accounts, according to the Ultimate Guide to NHIs.
- 79% of organisations have experienced secrets leaks, with 77% of these incidents resulting in tangible damage.
A question worth separating out:
Q: Should organisations treat service accounts like user accounts in Dynamics controls?
A: No. Service accounts should be governed as non-human identities with distinct ownership, purpose, rotation, and review requirements. They often have broader or less visible access than people, so the controls need to focus on lifecycle, usage, and blast radius rather than simple identity attributes.
👉 Read our full editorial: Active Directory hardening still hinges on identity exposure and privilege
