Browser-based attacks: is endpoint-only EDR still enough?

TL;DR: As work shifts into SaaS and browser sessions, attackers are bypassing endpoint telemetry through AiTM phishing, session hijacking, and malicious extensions, according to Push Security. The blind spot is structural: EDR protects the host, but it cannot observe the live application session where credentials and actions are now being abused.

NHIMG editorial — based on content published by Push Security: browser-based attacks and the limits of endpoint-only EDR

Questions worth separating out

Q: How should security teams handle browser-based attacks when EDR is already deployed?

A: Teams should treat EDR and browser protection as complementary, not interchangeable.

Q: Why do browser-based attacks complicate identity and access management programmes?

A: Because identity is exercised inside the browser session, not only at the login boundary.

Q: What do security teams get wrong about session hijacking?

A: They often treat it as a pure authentication problem when it is also a session-control problem.

Practitioner guidance

• Instrument browser-session telemetry Measure page rendering, credential submission, token use, and suspicious redirection inside the browser, because host telemetry will not reveal those interaction patterns.
• Block high-risk credential submission events Stop credential entry when the page structure, origin, or behaviour does not match the expected authentication flow, especially during real-time proxy attacks.
• Detect abnormal session reuse Watch for valid tokens being used in unusual locations, sequences, or interaction patterns, since session hijacking often bypasses password-based alarms.

What's in the full article

Push Security's full article covers the operational detail this post intentionally leaves for the source:

• Examples of real browser-native attack flows, including how AiTM phishing and malicious extensions behave inside active sessions.
• A practical checklist for detecting suspicious browser behaviour before account takeover completes.
• Guidance on how browser detection complements EDR rather than replacing it.
• Specific response actions that can interrupt malicious activity at the point of interaction.

👉 Read Push Security's analysis of browser-based attacks and EDR blind spots →

Browser-based attacks: is endpoint-only EDR still enough?

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