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12/06/2026 10:05 pm
TL;DR: Certificate-based authentication gives organisations a way to verify users, employee-owned devices, and connected machines without passwords, which matters as BYOD, IoT, and hardcoded credentials expand the trust boundary, according to Axiad. The control is only as strong as certificate lifecycle management, revocation discipline, and device inventory hygiene.
NHIMG editorial — based on content published by Axiad: 3 key use cases for certificate-based authentication
Questions worth separating out
Q: How should security teams use certificate-based authentication for BYOD access?
A: Treat BYOD certificates as temporary trust markers, not permanent device approval.
Q: Why do certificates matter for machine identities in connected environments?
A: Certificates matter because machines need an identity that can be checked, rotated, and revoked centrally.
Q: What do teams get wrong about certificate-based authentication?
A: Teams often assume the certificate itself is the control.
Practitioner guidance
- Map certificate trust to identity lifecycle events Tie issuance, renewal, revocation, and retirement to joiner, mover, and leaver workflows so certificates do not outlive the user, device, or machine they represent.
- Separate user, BYOD, and machine certificate policies Use different trust rules for employee devices, unmanaged endpoints, and kiosks or IoT systems so one certificate policy does not hide different risk profiles.
- Audit revocation speed and certificate inventory accuracy Test how quickly access can be removed after compromise, transfer, or decommissioning, and verify that every active certificate has a known owner and purpose.
What's in the full article
Axiad's full blog post covers the operational detail this post intentionally leaves for the source:
- Step-by-step examples of certificate-based login for Azure AD, BYOD Wi-Fi, and machine-to-machine access
- The practical differences between public certificates and private certificates in enterprise environments
- Device-side storage and replacement considerations for certificates that this post only summarizes
- Axiad's implementation-oriented explanation of where certificate-based authentication fits in a broader access programme
👉 Read Axiad's blog on certificate-based authentication use cases →
Certificate-based authentication for users, devices, and machines?
Explore further
13/06/2026 12:37 am
Certificate-based authentication is only as strong as certificate lifecycle governance. The article presents certificates as a cleaner trust primitive than passwords, but that advantage disappears if issuance, rotation, revocation, and offboarding are weak. In identity programmes, the control failure is rarely the certificate itself. It is the inability to prove that a certificate still belongs to the current user, device, or machine. Practitioners should read this as a lifecycle problem first and an authentication problem second.
A few things that frame the scale:
- 71% of NHIs are not rotated within recommended time frames, increasing the risk of compromise over time, according to Ultimate Guide to NHIs.
- Only 5.7% of organisations have full visibility into their service accounts, which means many certificate-backed machine identities are still difficult to inventory and govern.
A question worth separating out:
Q: How do organisations know whether certificate controls are working?
A: Look for evidence that certificates are unique, scoped, and quickly withdrawn when trust changes. A healthy programme can show who owns each certificate, what it protects, when it was last rotated, and how quickly revocation propagates. If those answers are unclear, the organisation has authentication coverage but not identity governance.
👉 Read our full editorial: Certificate-based authentication closes trust gaps for users, devices, and machines
