Topic starter
23/06/2026 7:02 pm
TL;DR: DNS spoofing works by tricking a recursive resolver into caching forged DNS answers, sending users to malicious destinations until the record expires, according to DigiCert. DNSSEC addresses that trust failure by requiring signed validation across the DNS chain of trust, which makes resolver-side verification a governance issue, not just a network setting.
Editorial analysis by NHI Mgmt Group, based on content published by DigiCert: “DNS Bytes: Tip”.
Key questions
Q: What breaks when recursive resolvers accept forged DNS answers?
A: The immediate break is trust in the resolution path.
Q: Why do AI chat tools create risk for identity and access teams?
A: They create risk because users may rely on plausible but unverified output when making identity, access, or security decisions.
Q: How can teams tell whether DNSSEC is actually protecting them?
A: Look for evidence that signed responses are being validated at the resolver and that critical zones are consistently protected.
Practitioner guidance
- Validate recursive resolver trust paths Confirm that your resolvers validate signed DNS responses before accepting records that drive user or service routing.
- Enable DNSSEC on critical domains Prioritise domains that support customer access, sign-in, workload routing, or other identity-dependent flows.
- Review cache-driven redirection exposure Map how long resolvers can continue serving stale or forged answers and how quickly changes propagate through your estate.
Bottom line: DNS spoofing succeeds when a resolver accepts a forged answer and reuses it through caching, which turns one bad response into a broader redirection risk.
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25/06/2026 2:49 am
DNS trust is now a governance problem, not just a resolver setting. DNSSEC is valuable because it changes who gets to assert trust in the lookup path and when that trust is verified. The operational lesson is that resolution integrity belongs in identity and access governance, because every redirected request can undermine downstream authentication and user trust.
A question worth separating out:
Q: What should organisations do when a malicious DNS record may have been cached?
A: Treat it as a containment and verification issue. Recheck the affected zone, confirm which resolvers cached the response, and ensure validation is active before normal traffic resumes. The goal is to stop further propagation of the forged answer and restore confidence in the lookup path.
👉 Read our full editorial: DNS spoofing exposes trust gaps that DNSSEC is built to close