Topic starter
25/06/2026 12:41 am
TL;DR: Fragmented identity stores, orphaned accounts, privilege creep, and weak lifecycle controls create persistent IAM risk across employees, contractors, service accounts, and digital agents, according to SafePaaS. Security-first identity and access management is now about closing operational gaps before compliance reporting can catch up.
Editorial analysis by NHI Mgmt Group, based on content published by SafePaaS: “Why Modern Enterprises Need Security-First Identity and Access Management Software”.
Key questions
Q: What breaks when identity governance is split across cloud and on-premise systems?
A: The biggest failure is inconsistent control ownership.
Q: Why does privilege creep increase security risk even when access reviews exist?
A: Privilege creep increases risk because reviews often examine snapshots, while excess permissions accumulate between review cycles.
Q: What are the signs that lifecycle access management is failing in IAM operations?
A: Common signs include manual entry delays, inconsistent access after a promotion or transfer, lingering access after departure, and orphaned accounts that are not clearly owned.
Practitioner guidance
- Inventory every identity store Map authoritative sources, shadow directories, and application-local identity stores so duplicated accounts and divergent entitlements are visible before they are reviewed.
- Automate joiner-mover-leaver controls Connect role change and offboarding events to immediate entitlement updates so access does not persist after a business need has ended.
- Put service accounts under ownership Assign named owners, purpose statements, and retirement triggers to service accounts and other non-human identities so they do not become unmanaged exceptions.
Bottom line: Fragmented identity stores turn IAM into a reconciliation exercise, which leaves duplicated accounts and inconsistent entitlements in place.
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25/06/2026 9:39 am
Identity fragmentation is now a governance failure, not just an IT sprawl problem. When cloud, SaaS, on-prem, and third-party systems each hold their own identity truth, no team can confidently answer who still has access. That creates a structural blind spot for IAM, IGA, and PAM programmes alike, because review evidence is already fragmented before the review begins. Practitioners should treat reconciliation as a control objective, not a reporting task.
A few things that frame the scale:
- 80% of identity breaches involved compromised non-human identities such as service accounts and API keys, according to the Ultimate Guide to NHIs.
- 92% of organisations expose NHIs to third parties, raising concerns about supply chain security, according to the Ultimate Guide to NHIs.
A question worth separating out:
Q: How should teams govern service accounts and bots alongside human users?
A: Treat service accounts, bots, and other non-human identities as owned assets with explicit purpose, review, and retirement rules. They need the same lifecycle discipline as human identities, but with tighter inventory, stronger change tracking, and clearer accountability because they are often more persistent and less visible.
👉 Read our full editorial: Security-first identity and access management closes enterprise gaps