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11/07/2026 8:34 pm
TL;DR: Least privilege only works when access is both minimal and short lived, and the article argues that modern Zero Trust must extend that discipline to users, service accounts, APIs, and machine-to-machine traffic, according to Zero Networks. The real challenge is operationalizing continuous enforcement across sprawling identity sprawl, not writing another policy.
NHIMG editorial — based on content published by Zero Networks: A Practical Guide to Least Privilege Access
By the numbers:
- Only 2.6% of workload identity permissions are actually used.
- 51% of workload identities are completely inactive.
Questions worth separating out
Q: What breaks when least privilege is applied only at review time?
A: Least privilege becomes a snapshot rather than a control.
Q: Why do service accounts and workload identities create so much least-privilege risk?
A: They usually outnumber human accounts, change more often, and are frequently granted broad access for convenience.
Q: How do security teams know whether least privilege is actually working?
A: Least privilege is working when identities have narrowly scoped permissions, unused credentials are removed or quarantined, and repeated access reviews consistently shrink entitlements.
Practitioner guidance
- Audit privilege creep across all identity types Inventory user, service account, and workload permissions, then identify access that has no current operational owner or business purpose.
- Close privileged access paths by default Keep RDP, SSH, SMB, and other privileged routes closed unless an identity is actively verified for a specific task.
- Tie machine identity rights to owner and expiry Require every service account, API key, and workload identity to have a named owner, a documented purpose, and an expiry or review trigger.
What's in the full article
Zero Networks' full guide covers the operational detail this post intentionally leaves for the source:
- Step-by-step guidance on applying least privilege across users, service accounts, APIs, and machine-to-machine communications.
- Practical examples of identity segmentation and just-in-time MFA in environments with privileged ports and legacy applications.
- Operational detail on automating policy creation and enforcement so access does not drift as the environment changes.
- Compliance mapping examples for Zero Trust and least privilege across common regulatory requirements.
👉 Read Zero Networks' practical guide to least privilege access and Zero Trust →
Least privilege access in Zero Trust environments: are your controls keeping up?
Explore further
11/07/2026 9:01 pm
Least privilege has become a runtime control problem, not a policy problem. The article correctly shows that manual exception lists and static permissions do not scale once identity sprawl expands across users, machines, and service accounts. Continuous enforcement matters more than periodic review because access drift is operational, not theoretical. Practitioners should treat least privilege as an always-on control plane.
A few things that frame the scale:
- Only 20% have formal processes for offboarding and revoking API keys, and even fewer have procedures for rotating them, according to the Ultimate Guide to NHIs.
- 91.6% of secrets remain valid five days after the targeted organisation is notified, showing a critical gap in remediation procedures.
A question worth separating out:
Q: What do security teams get wrong about Zero Trust and identity governance?
A: They often treat Zero Trust as an integration label rather than a continuous operating requirement. If identity signals are inconsistent across tools, the organisation may enforce local checks while still lacking enterprise-wide assurance. The mistake is assuming adoption equals execution when the data model and control surfaces do not line up.
👉 Read our full editorial: Least privilege access is shifting from policy to runtime control
