TL;DR: The principle of least privilege should apply across users, service accounts, devices, and processes to reduce over-provisioning, improve audit readiness, and limit breach impact, according to Zluri. The real governance issue is that access programmes still assume privilege can be set once and left alone, while also supporting just-in-time access and continuous review.
NHIMG editorial — based on content published by Zluri: Understanding the principle of least privilege, an in-depth guide
By the numbers:
- 70% of organisations grant AI systems more access than they would give a human employee performing the exact same job.
- 97% of NHIs carry excessive privileges, increasing unauthorised access and broadening the attack surface.
Questions worth separating out
Q: How should security teams implement least privilege in SaaS environments?
A: Start by defining the minimum actions each identity needs, then map those actions to narrowly scoped roles and permissions.
Q: Why do service accounts make least privilege harder to enforce?
A: Service accounts often run unattended, so excess privilege can persist unnoticed long after the original task has ended.
Q: What breaks when just-in-time access is not revoked reliably?
A: The control becomes standing privilege with a temporary label, which means the security benefit disappears after the approval window closes.
Practitioner guidance
- Map access to tasks, not job titles. Review SaaS entitlements by the specific actions each identity must perform, then strip inherited permissions that are convenient but unnecessary.
- Replace standing privilege with time-bounded elevation. Issue elevated access only for the duration of a defined task and ensure automatic revocation at the end of that task.
- Audit service accounts and integrations together. Include non-human accounts, third-party connections, and application credentials in the same privilege review cycle as human users.
What's in the full article
Zluri's full guide covers the operational detail this post intentionally leaves for the source:
- Step-by-step examples of least-privilege implementation across SaaS applications and privileged user workflows
- Practical guidance on using role-based access control, JIT access, and auto-revocation in day-to-day administration
- Examples of audit logging and access review practices for proving least privilege to internal reviewers and auditors
- Vendor-specific workflow details for onboarding, deprovisioning, and adjusting permissions inside its platform
👉 Read Zluri's guide to principle of least privilege in SaaS access control →
Least privilege for SaaS access: what IAM teams need now?
Explore further
Least privilege has moved from access hygiene to identity blast-radius control. Once SaaS estates, integrations, and privileged sessions expand, the real question is not whether access exists, but how far a compromised identity can move. The article reflects a broader market truth: over-privilege is now the default failure mode in identity programmes. Practitioners should treat blast-radius reduction as the primary objective of access governance.
A few things that frame the scale:
- 67% of organisations still rely heavily on static credentials despite the risks they pose to agentic AI deployments, according to the 2026 Infrastructure Identity Survey.
- Only 13% of organisations feel extremely prepared for the reality of agentic AI despite the majority racing toward autonomous adoption.
A question worth separating out:
Q: Who is accountable when excessive privilege causes a breach or audit failure?
A: Accountability sits with the teams that own identity governance, access administration, and control assurance, not just the application owner. If access reviews, revocation, and exception handling are fragmented, no one has end-to-end responsibility for the risk. Frameworks such as the NIST Cybersecurity Framework and Zero Trust both place that accountability inside governance, not after the fact.
👉 Read our full editorial: Principle of least privilege in SaaS access governance