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25/06/2026 12:56 am
TL;DR: Machine identities are only one subset of the broader NHI category, and service accounts, API keys, tokens, certificates, bots, and legal entities need different governance patterns across discovery, least privilege, rotation, and monitoring, according to P0 Security. The distinction matters because treating all non-human identities the same leaves lifecycle and credential controls misaligned with real exposure paths.
NHIMG editorial — based on content published by P0 Security: Non-Human Identities vs. Machine Identities: Key Differences & Security Best Practices
By the numbers:
- 44% of NHI tokens are exposed in the wild, being sent or stored over platforms like Teams, Jira tickets, Confluence pages, and code commits.
- 91% of former employee tokens remain active after offboarding, leaving organisations vulnerable to potential security breaches.
Questions worth separating out
Q: How should security teams govern machine identities and other NHIs differently?
A: Security teams should separate machine identities from broader NHI classes, then assign controls to the identity type and use case rather than to a generic non-human label.
Q: Why do exposed secrets create more risk than isolated credential storage issues?
A: Exposed secrets create more risk because duplication expands the attack surface.
Q: What breaks when organisations treat all non-human identities as the same thing?
A: Controls break because different NHIs require different lifecycle, privilege, and monitoring patterns.
Practitioner guidance
- Separate machine identity from broader NHI classes Create distinct inventory fields for workloads, devices, service accounts, API keys, tokens, and bots so each can carry its own owner, rotation method, and retirement path.
- Map secret distribution paths Track every place a secret is copied, including code repositories, tickets, collaboration tools, and deployment pipelines, so revocation can remove all live copies.
- Tie least privilege to task context Review each NHI against the specific workflow it supports, then remove inherited permissions that are not required for that function or dependency chain.
What's in the full article
P0 Security's full article covers the operational detail this post intentionally leaves for the source:
- The article breaks down the practical examples used to distinguish devices, applications, automated processes, and legal entities.
- It outlines the recommended steps for discovery, central management, least privilege, credential security, and monitoring.
- It gives the FAQ-style explanations that teams can use internally when standardising terminology across IAM and security stakeholders.
👉 Read P0 Security's guide to non-human identities vs machine identities →
Non-human identities vs machine identities: are your controls aligned?
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25/06/2026 10:03 am
Machine identity governance is too narrow to cover the real NHI problem. Machine identities describe one subset of the estate, but the operational risk sits across service accounts, API keys, tokens, bots, and other non-human credentials. When governance is framed only around workloads and certificates, the programme misses where most credential exposure and lifecycle failure actually happens. The implication is that identity teams need a broader NHI governance model, not a machine-only one.
A few things that frame the scale:
- 85% of organisations lack full visibility into third-party vendors connected via OAuth apps, according to The State of Non-Human Identity Security.
- Only 1.5 out of 10 organisations are highly confident in their ability to secure NHIs, compared to nearly 1 in 4 for securing human identities.
A question worth separating out:
Q: How do teams reduce NHI risk after a system, vendor, or workflow is retired?
A: Teams should revoke credentials as part of the retirement process, not as a separate cleanup task. That means identifying every token, key, and service account tied to the departing system, then confirming that no dependent service still uses them. Offboarding only works when ownership is explicit and revocation is verified across all copies.
👉 Read our full editorial: Non-human identities vs machine identities: governance gaps to close
