Topic starter
25/06/2026 1:23 am
TL;DR: Broad permissions, long-lived credentials and weak ownership are widening machine identity risk, SecurEnds argues. Identity programmes need owners, shorter credential lifetimes and regular recertification to cut blast radius and improve auditability.
Editorial analysis by NHI Mgmt Group, based on content published by SecurEnds: “Least Privilege for Non-Human Identities: APIs, Bots, and Service Accounts”.
Key questions
Q: Why do long-lived machine credentials create more risk than short-lived access?
A: Long-lived machine credentials create more risk because they can be copied, reused, and forgotten across pipelines and infrastructure.
Q: What are the signs that machine identity management is failing in an organisation?
A: Common signs include incomplete inventory, spreadsheet based tracking, manual renewal processes, unclear ownership, and repeated certificate expiry events.
Q: What breaks when non-human identities are not included in least privilege reviews?
A: When non-human identities are left out of least privilege reviews, access tends to accumulate quietly across service accounts, API keys, tokens, and automation workflows.
Practitioner guidance
- Assign an owner to every machine identity Record a named business owner, technical custodian and lifecycle path for every service account, API token, bot and CI/CD identity.
- Replace static secrets with short-lived credentials Prioritise ephemeral tokens, workload federation and temporary credentials for identities that do not need long-term secret persistence.
- Scope machine permissions to specific resources Remove wildcard and broad administrative grants from non-human identities and constrain them to the exact applications, cloud resources or environments they need to run.
Bottom line: Non-human identities now sit at the centre of enterprise automation, and their access model often matters more than the automation itself.
Glossary terms: Least Privilege, Non-Human Identity (NHI), Machine Identity Governance, Long-Lived Secret
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This topic was modified 1 day ago by NHI Mgmt Group
25/06/2026 10:45 am
Least privilege for non-human identities is no longer a hardening measure, it is the baseline governance model. Machine identities now sit inside core delivery paths, so excess privilege becomes an operational design flaw rather than a marginal risk. When APIs, bots and service accounts run continuously, the difference between scoped and unscoped access is the difference between contained failure and enterprise-wide blast radius.
A few things that frame the scale:
- NHIs outnumber human identities by 25x to 50x in modern enterprises, according to the Ultimate Guide to NHIs.
- 96% of organisations store secrets outside of secrets managers in vulnerable locations including code, config files, and CI/CD tools, according to the Ultimate Guide to NHIs.
A question worth separating out:
Q: How should security teams prioritise machine identity cleanup?
A: Start with identities that combine high privilege, continuous operation and weak ownership. Those accounts create the largest blast radius because they are both hard to notice and highly capable once compromised, especially in cloud and CI/CD environments.
👉 Read our full editorial: Long-lived machine credentials make least privilege harder to sustain
This post was modified 1 day ago by NHI Mgmt Group