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12/06/2026 10:08 pm
TL;DR: Passwordless authentication reduces password compromise risk, but biometric/device theft, insider misuse, and partial rollout can still leave organisations exposed, according to Axiad. The real issue is not whether passwordless works, but whether IAM, PKI, and lifecycle controls are complete enough to keep it safe in practice.
NHIMG editorial — based on content published by Axiad: Is Passwordless Authentication Safe?
By the numbers:
- 79% of organisations have experienced secrets leaks, with 77% of these incidents resulting in tangible damage.
- Only 5.7% of organisations have full visibility into their service accounts.
- 97% of NHIs carry excessive privileges, increasing unauthorised access and broadening the attack surface.
Questions worth separating out
Q: What breaks when passwordless authentication is only partially deployed?
A: Partial deployment creates identity fragmentation.
Q: Why does passwordless authentication still need strong IAM governance?
A: Passwordless removes passwords, but it does not remove identity assurance, recovery, or privilege management.
Q: How can security teams tell whether passwordless is actually safer?
A: Look for consistency, not just adoption.
Practitioner guidance
- Inventory every fallback authentication path Map biometric recovery, help desk reset, legacy password exceptions, and device replacement flows.
- Bind passwordless access to managed devices and certificate lifecycle Use PKI or equivalent cryptographic binding where possible, then track issuance, renewal, revocation, and device retirement as part of identity governance rather than endpoint cleanup.
- Test partial deployment as an attack path Run tabletop scenarios that assume one application, one user group, or one recovery flow remains password-based.
What's in the full article
Axiad's full blog covers the implementation detail this post intentionally leaves for the source:
- Practical examples of how passwordless authentication can be paired with device-based verification.
- Discussion of PKI-based authentication as a supporting control for safer passwordless deployments.
- Additional explanation of why partial migration to passwordless leaves residual security gaps.
- Vendor framing on how organizations should think about moving from passwords to alternative authentication methods.
👉 Read Axiad's analysis of whether passwordless authentication is safe →
Passwordless authentication is safe? Where the governance gaps still are?
Explore further
13/06/2026 12:42 am
Passwordless authentication reduces one compromise path, but it does not solve identity governance by itself. Removing passwords eliminates a familiar weak factor, yet the organisation still has to govern device trust, recovery, certificate lifecycle, and administrative access. The practical conclusion is that passwordless is a control change, not a control substitute.
A few things that frame the scale:
- 91.6% of secrets remain valid five days after the targeted organisation is notified, showing a critical gap in remediation procedures, according to Ultimate Guide to NHIs.
- 71% of NHIs are not rotated within recommended time frames, increasing the risk of compromise over time, according to NHI Mgmt Group research.
A question worth separating out:
Q: Who is accountable when passwordless access fails?
A: Accountability usually sits with identity, security, and platform owners together. The failure often spans enrollment, device management, help desk recovery, and application policy, so no single team can own it alone. Organisations should define who approves exceptions, who revokes access, and who audits the full authentication lifecycle.
👉 Read our full editorial: Passwordless authentication is safer, but only with complete rollout
