Topic starter
24/06/2026 9:23 pm
TL;DR: Salesforce’s expanding mix of users, integrations, APIs, and automated workflows is widening the attack surface while secrets sprawl, over-privilege, and weak auditability make authorization harder to govern, according to Entro Security. The core issue is not just access volume but the assumption that quarterly reviews and static permissions can keep pace with fast-moving non-human identities.
Editorial analysis by NHI Mgmt Group, based on content published by Entro Security: “Salesforce Security Challenges, Authorization, and Access Management”.
Key questions
Q: What breaks when Salesforce integrations rely on shared non-human credentials?
A: Shared machine credentials break ownership, traceability, and offboarding.
Q: Why do APIs and service accounts often expand unauthorized access risk?
A: APIs and service accounts often carry broad, persistent permissions that are hard to see and easy to reuse.
Q: How do security teams know whether Salesforce access reviews are actually working?
A: Access reviews are working only if they remove stale privileges before they become usable in production.
Practitioner guidance
- Map every Salesforce non-human identity Inventory service accounts, API integrations, automation users, and connected apps, then assign an owner and a business purpose to each one.
- Replace long-lived secrets with short-lived tokens Move API access toward short-lived OAuth or JWT-based credentials and remove hardcoded secrets from Apex, metadata, and adjacent systems.
- Reduce standing privilege in Salesforce roles Rework role hierarchies, permission sets, and field-level access so integrations and admins hold only the minimum scope needed for current tasks.
Bottom line: Salesforce security problems in this article are driven by identity sprawl, secrets sprawl, and over-privileged access across both people and machines.
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25/06/2026 6:35 am
Salesforce identity governance is now a hybrid problem of human access, NHI lifecycle, and authorization drift. The article shows that the platform is no longer governed well by user-centric access reviews alone because service accounts, APIs, and automated workflows have become first-class identities. That shifts the operating model from periodic review toward continuous lifecycle control. Practitioners need to govern Salesforce as an identity fabric, not just an application.
A question worth separating out:
Q: Should organisations prioritise secrets governance or role cleanup first in Salesforce?
A: Start with the credentials that can still be used, then clean up the privilege model around them. If secrets remain exposed or long-lived, role cleanup alone will not stop misuse. If permissions are broad but unused credentials are removed, you still need to tighten the residual trust boundary.
👉 Read our full editorial: Salesforce security and access management are under strain