Topic starter
08/07/2026 7:08 pm
TL;DR: Traditional PAM strategies still rely on standing privileges, manual rotation, and visibility gaps that attackers can turn into ransomware footholds, according to Infisical’s analysis. The real shift is from managing permanent access to removing persistent privilege and making credentials invisible to users.
Editorial analysis by NHI Mgmt Group, based on content published by Infisical: “Privileged Access Management Best Practices: Beyond Tradi...”.
Key questions
Q: What breaks when privileged access is not continuously governed?
A: When privileged access is not continuously governed, standing privilege persists, dormant accounts remain usable, and the attack surface expands across human and machine identities.
Q: What problem does ownership attribution solve for service accounts and API keys?
A: It closes the gap between exposure detection and accountable remediation.
Q: How do security teams know whether PAM is actually reducing privilege risk?
A: Measure how much privileged access is permanent, how often elevation is task-scoped, and whether session activity matches the approved purpose.
Practitioner guidance
- Audit all standing privileged access Map permanent admin rights, service account entitlements, API key reach, and any technical-user access that persists beyond a single task.
- Move high-risk systems to just-in-time access Start with production administration, break-glass paths, and any access that can modify security controls, then require task-scoped expiry for each elevation.
- Remove direct secret exposure from users Use credential injection, session brokering, and certificate-based access so operators do not handle the underlying secret in routine workflows.
Bottom line: Standing privilege remains the main weakness in traditional PAM because it keeps high-risk access alive long after the original business need has passed.
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08/07/2026 7:32 pm
Standing privilege is now the governance flaw, not just an implementation weakness: Permanent access assumes the need for privilege is stable and observable over time. That assumption breaks when attackers can exploit long-lived credentials faster than teams can review them. The implication is that PAM must be judged by how much persistent access still exists, not by how many approvals a process has.
A few things that frame the scale:
- 80% of identity breaches involved compromised non-human identities such as service accounts and API keys, according to the Ultimate Guide to NHIs.
- Only 20% have formal processes for offboarding and revoking API keys, and even fewer have procedures for rotating them, according to the Ultimate Guide to NHIs.
A question worth separating out:
Q: Should organisations treat technical users as privileged by default?
A: Yes, when those users can reach production, modify configuration, or access sensitive data. The governance mistake is limiting PAM to classic admin accounts while leaving developers, contractors, SaaS super users, and workload identities outside the same control discipline.
👉 Read our full editorial: Privileged access management is moving beyond standing credentials