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12/06/2026 9:06 pm
TL;DR: Zero Trust Identity and Access Management reduces standing trust by enforcing continuous verification, least privilege, microsegmentation, MFA, and just-in-time access, according to Zluri. The model is only as strong as the identity controls behind it, and those controls must account for both human and non-human access paths.
NHIMG editorial — based on content published by Zluri: Zero Trust Identity and Access Management: A 101 Guide
By the numbers:
- 90% of IT leaders say properly managing NHIs is essential for a successful zero-trust implementation.
- 97% of NHIs carry excessive privileges, increasing unauthorised access and broadening the attack surface.
- Only 5.7% of organisations have full visibility into their service accounts.
Questions worth separating out
Q: How should security teams implement zero trust IAM across human and machine identities?
A: Start by separating identity classes and governing each one with controls that match its behaviour.
Q: Why do service accounts and API keys create problems for zero trust programmes?
A: Because they often carry standing access, are reused across systems, and are not reviewed as rigorously as human accounts.
Q: What breaks when least privilege is not enforced in a zero trust model?
A: The model stops containing blast radius.
Practitioner guidance
- Map every zero trust control to an identity type Separate human access, service accounts, workload identities, and any AI-driven execution paths before applying policies.
- Reduce standing privilege before extending zero trust claims Identify accounts that retain access after the task ends, then remove persistent entitlements, especially for machine identities that are rarely reviewed with the same rigour as people.
- Tie segmentation to entitlement scope Review whether a credential can both authenticate and move laterally across adjacent systems.
What's in the full article
Zluri's full guide covers the operational detail this post intentionally leaves for the source:
- A step-by-step explanation of the six zero trust IAM practices the article recommends for implementation.
- Detailed breakdowns of user authentication, network access control, and behavioural monitoring in Zluri's own framework.
- The article's discussion of how Zluri positions zero trust IAM against traditional perimeter-based access models.
- Practical examples of how Zluri maps MFA, device checks, and JIT access into a working access control stack.
👉 Read Zluri's guide to zero trust identity and access management →
Zero trust IAM: are your identity controls keeping up?
Explore further
12/06/2026 10:58 pm
Zero trust IAM is still an identity governance model, not a control outcome. The article correctly frames continuous verification, least privilege, and segmentation as core principles, but those principles only work if identity state is accurate and revocation is enforceable. In practice, the model fails when access is broader than intended, stale, or impossible to trace across users, service accounts, and tokens. Practitioners should treat zero trust as a governance discipline that must be proved in operations, not assumed from policy language.
A few things that frame the scale:
- 97% of NHIs carry excessive privileges, increasing unauthorised access and broadening the attack surface, according to Ultimate Guide to NHIs.
- Only 5.7% of organisations have full visibility into their service accounts, which means most zero trust programmes are trying to govern what they cannot fully see.
A question worth separating out:
Q: Who is accountable when zero trust controls fail to stop unauthorised access?
A: Accountability sits with the identity, access, and platform owners who defined the trust boundary and the revocation process, not just with the security team. In practice, failures usually come from unclear ownership of entitlements, missing lifecycle control for machine identities, or policies that were never tested against real operational conditions.
👉 Read our full editorial: Zero trust IAM still relies on identity controls that break
