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12/06/2026 10:24 pm
TL;DR: Agentic AI and embedded copilots are expanding SaaS attack surfaces through persistent OAuth connections and overly permissive integrations, according to Obsidian Security. The governance gap is no longer just access scope, but whether identity controls can see and contain non-human actors operating inside business apps.
NHIMG editorial — based on content published by Obsidian Security: Leading SaaS security platform strengthens executive bench as the company scales toward growth funding
By the numbers:
- Obsidian Security protects more than 200 organizations across North America, Europe, the Middle East, Southeast Asia, Australia, and New Zealand.
Questions worth separating out
Q: How should security teams govern SaaS integrations that use persistent OAuth tokens?
A: They should treat persistent OAuth grants as identity objects with owners, purposes, and revocation paths.
Q: Why do AI agents increase risk in SaaS environments?
A: AI agents increase risk because they can operate through existing application permissions and continue using them as tasks change.
Q: What do teams get wrong about OAuth security in business apps?
A: Teams often focus on the token and miss the relationship behind it.
Practitioner guidance
- Inventory persistent SaaS delegations Build a complete register of OAuth grants, app-to-app links, and embedded copilots, then assign each one to a business owner and a renewal date.
- Separate AI-enabled workflows from standard automation Tag workflows that can initiate actions inside SaaS tools without direct human approval, and treat them as non-human identity pathways with explicit control boundaries.
- Review token behaviour and app relationships together Correlate token usage with workload context, in-app activity, and the expected relationship between the application and the data it touches.
What's in the full analysis
Obsidian Security's full article covers the operational detail this post intentionally leaves for the source:
- Leadership expansion details and the operating assumptions behind scaling a SaaS security programme
- How the vendor connects application sprawl, embedded copilots, and AI agents to broader SaaS risk
- The role of its Knowledge Graph in correlating SaaS, endpoint, network, and identity data
- Company context on growth readiness and the market narrative around securing SaaS in the era of agentic AI
👉 Read Obsidian Security's analysis of agentic AI risk in SaaS security →
Agentic AI and SaaS security: are OAuth controls keeping up?
Explore further
13/06/2026 1:08 am
Agentic AI turns OAuth from delegated convenience into governance exposure. Persistent connections were designed for stable, human-defined workflows, where access could be reviewed against a known purpose and a known operator. That assumption weakens when the actor is non-human and can keep acting inside the same integration path across changing tasks and contexts. Practitioners need to treat delegation chains as active identity surfaces, not static plumbing.
A few things that frame the scale:
- Companies are dedicating an average of 32.4% of their security budgets to secrets management and code security, with US organisations leading at 40.8%, according to The State of Secrets in AppSec.
- Only 44% of developers are reported to follow security best practices for secrets management, exposing a significant developer behaviour gap.
A question worth separating out:
Q: Who is accountable when a non-human actor abuses delegated SaaS access?
A: Accountability should sit with the business owner of the integration, the platform team that approved the grant, and the security function that monitors its use. If no one owns the delegation lifecycle, then the organisation has created access that can persist without meaningful oversight.
👉 Read our full editorial: Agentic AI is reshaping SaaS security and OAuth risk
