TL;DR: Akeyless argues that API keys remain a breach-prone bearer credential because they are static, long-lived, and weakly bound to identity, while GitGuardian found 28,649,024 new secrets exposed on public GitHub in 2025. Static credential management is no longer enough when AI agents and service sprawl have already outgrown the assumptions behind traditional IAM.
Editorial analysis by NHI Mgmt Group, based on content published by Akeyless: “API Key Management: Why API Keys Are Insecure and What to Do Instead”.
By the numbers:
- AI service credential leaks increased 81% year-over-year in 2025.
Key questions
Q: What breaks when customer-owned API keys are not lifecycle-managed?
A: When customer-owned API keys are not lifecycle-managed, access can persist after ownership changes, business relationships shift, or a workflow is retired.
Q: Why do long-lived API keys create more risk for AI agents?
A: Long-lived API keys increase risk because they persist across tasks, deployments, and runtime changes.
Q: How do security teams know when static API key management is failing?
A: Failure shows up when keys cannot be inventoried confidently, rotated without service disruption, or revoked without breaking dependent systems.
Practitioner guidance
- Audit static key inventories Map where API keys exist across code, CI/CD, config files, collaboration tools, and agent runtimes, then identify which services still depend on bearer credentials.
- Replace static keys with runtime credentials Use workload identity, short-lived tokens, or OAuth client credentials for service-to-service and AI agent access where the platform supports it.
- Set rotation based on exposure risk Use event-driven rotation for suspected compromise, deployment, or scope change, and reserve calendar rotation for lower-risk legacy cases.
Bottom line: API keys persist as a weak access model because they are bearer credentials with no native expiry or identity binding.
What's in the full article
Akeyless's full guide covers the operational detail this post intentionally leaves for the source:
- Step-by-step guidance for storing, rotating, and revoking API keys across services and environments
- Practical comparison of API keys, OAuth 2.0 client credentials, JWTs, mTLS, and workload identity
- Agent-specific guidance for removing static secrets from prompts, logs, and MCP configuration files
- Tooling and rollout considerations for secrets managers, scanners, and runtime credential issuance
👉 Read Akeyless's guide to API key management and the move beyond static credentials →
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Static API keys are now a lifecycle problem, not an authentication convenience. The article is correct to frame the issue as structural rather than operationally annoying. A bearer credential with no native expiry, no identity binding, and weak revocation signalling outgrows the IAM model that assumed access was stable enough to be managed later. Practitioners should stop treating key handling as storage hygiene and start treating it as access lifecycle governance.
A few things that frame the scale:
- 28.65 million new hardcoded secrets were detected in public GitHub commits in 2025 alone, a 34% year-over-year increase and the largest single-year jump ever recorded, according to the State of Secrets Sprawl 2026.
- 96% of organisations store secrets outside of secrets managers in vulnerable locations including code, config files, and CI/CD tools, according to the Ultimate Guide to NHIs.
A question worth separating out:
Q: Should organisations keep API keys or move to workload identity and short-lived tokens?
A: Wherever the use case allows it, move to workload identity or short-lived tokens. Use static API keys only as a transitional control for low-sensitivity integrations that cannot yet support stronger runtime credentials, and treat every remaining key as a temporary exception.
👉 Read our full editorial: API key management fails when static credentials outgrow IAM