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Does CVE-2025-53967 show Figma MCP server confusion is the real risk?

 

(@nhi-mgmt-group)
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TL;DR: Two Figma MCP servers are often conflated, but only figma-developer-mcp carried CVE-2025-53967, a CVSS 8.0 command injection that could reach RCE through fallback curl shell calls, according to Repello AI. Local process privilege and loose package identity checks can turn a tooling flaw into workstation compromise.

Editorial analysis by NHI Mgmt Group, based on content published by Repello AI: “Figma MCP Server Security: What CVE-2025-53967 Actually Broke”.

By the numbers:

  • The vulnerability was scored CVSS 8.0 and fixed in version 0.6.3 on 29 September 2025.

Key questions

Q: Why do local MCP server bugs become more serious than similar web bugs?

A: Local MCP servers often execute with the developer's own privileges, so a successful exploit can reach files, tokens, SSH material, and other workstation-held secrets.

Q: How can teams tell whether an MCP package is actually safe to use?

A: They cannot rely on labels alone.

Q: What is the failure mode when an MCP server uses shell commands in fallback logic?

A: The failure mode is that untrusted input can be treated as shell syntax instead of data, so a retry path becomes a command injection surface.

Practitioner guidance

  • Verify the exact MCP package name Open the client configuration and confirm whether the installed server is the official Figma Dev Mode server or figma-developer-mcp.
  • Pin the running version Replace floating npx launches with an exact package version or a locally installed dependency so the server binary does not change silently on restart.
  • Restrict local process privileges Run the MCP server with the narrowest filesystem and network access it needs, because command execution inherits the server process privileges.

Bottom line: The core risk is not just command injection, but confusion over which MCP server is actually in use and whether it is pinned.

Glossary terms: Model Context Protocol, Command injection, Software provenance, Process containment

Explore further

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This topic was modified 1 week ago by NHI Mgmt Group

   
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(@mr-nhi)
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Joined: 6 months ago
Posts: 20715
 

Package identity is now a security control, not a documentation detail. When two software components share the same product label, teams cannot rely on screenshots, blog posts, or memory to determine exposure. The control point is the actual package name and version recorded in the client configuration. For MCP deployments, inventory accuracy is part of the trust boundary, not an administrative nicety.

A few things that frame the scale:

  • 24,008 unique secrets were exposed in MCP configuration files in 2025 alone, the protocol's first year of widespread adoption, according to the State of Secrets Sprawl 2026.

A question worth separating out:

Q: Should organisations treat npx-installed MCP servers differently from pinned packages?

A: Yes. Floating npx installs are convenient but they weaken version control, reproducibility, and incident traceability. A pinned package gives you an explicit approval point and a stable artefact to assess, while a floating install can change whenever the registry changes. For governed environments, that difference is material to both risk and auditability.

👉 Read our full editorial: Figma MCP server confusion turns one package into an RCE risk


This post was modified 1 week ago by NHI Mgmt Group

   
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