TL;DR: Two different Figma MCP servers are often conflated, but only the community package figma-developer-mcp carried CVE-2025-53967, a CVSS 8.0 command injection that could reach remote code execution through a fallback curl shell call, according to Repello AI research. The issue shows why package identity, version pinning, and local-process containment matter more than the label shown in a config file.
Editorial analysis by NHI Mgmt Group, based on content published by Repello AI: “Figma MCP Server Security: What CVE-2025-53967 Actually Broke”.
By the numbers:
- The vulnerability was scored CVSS 8.0 and fixed in version 0.6.3 on 29 September 2025.
Key questions
Q: What is the failure mode when an MCP server uses shell commands in fallback logic?
A: The failure mode is that untrusted input can be treated as shell syntax instead of data, so a retry path becomes a command injection surface.
Q: Why do local MCP server bugs become more serious than similar web bugs?
A: Local MCP servers often execute with the developer's own privileges, so a successful exploit can reach files, tokens, SSH material, and other workstation-held secrets.
Q: How can teams tell whether an MCP package is actually safe to use?
A: They cannot rely on labels alone.
Practitioner guidance
- Verify the exact MCP package name Open the client configuration and confirm whether the installed server is the official Figma Dev Mode server or figma-developer-mcp.
- Pin the running version Replace floating npx launches with an exact package version or a locally installed dependency so the server binary does not change silently on restart.
- Restrict local process privileges Run the MCP server with the narrowest filesystem and network access it needs, because command execution inherits the server process privileges.
Bottom line: The core risk is not just command injection, but confusion over which MCP server is actually in use and whether it is pinned.
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