TL;DR: Scattered Lapsus$ Hunters, Push Security reports, are pairing vishing with adversary-in-the-middle phishing to steal SSO credentials, MFA codes and live sessions across Okta, Entra and Google. SSO sessions now need recovery rules and detection that can catch live theft, not just static logins.
Editorial analysis by NHI Mgmt Group, based on content published by Push Security: “Unpacking the latest SLH campaign â combining vishing with AiTM phishing to hijack SSO accounts”.
Key questions
Q: Why do SSO compromises create such broad downstream risk?
A: Because the primary login becomes a control plane for many connected applications.
Q: What are the signs that an identity provider account has been abused through phishing?
A: Look for unusual MFA enrolment changes, unexpected passkey creation, logins from uncharacteristic browser or device combinations, and new sessions followed by rapid access to multiple SaaS applications.
Q: What breaks when vishing is combined with AiTM phishing against SSO accounts?
A: The failure is the assumption that authentication happens in a trusted, static channel.
Practitioner guidance
- Harden SSO recovery and help-desk verification Require out-of-band identity verification for password resets, MFA changes and passkey enrolment so voice-based impersonation cannot drive account takeover.
- Detect live session theft in the browser Use browser telemetry to flag cloned login pages, suspicious login flows and real-time MFA relay behaviour before the session is established.
- Review downstream application exposure Map which SaaS platforms inherit access from each primary SSO identity so a single compromised login can be contained quickly.
Bottom line: Hybrid vishing plus AiTM phishing turns SSO into a broad access gateway, so one compromised login can expose multiple connected services at once.
Glossary terms: Hybrid vishing, Adversary-in-the-middle phishing, SSO session hijacking, Identity Recovery
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SSO compromise has become an access multiplier, not a login event: Once an attacker reaches the identity provider, the real target is the downstream application graph. The article shows why federated access concentrates risk into a single session boundary that was never designed to carry this much trust. For practitioners, SSO must be governed as a high-blast-radius control plane, not just an authentication convenience.
A few things that frame the scale:
- Across one million observed logins, 1 in 4 were password-based rather than SSO, 2 in 5 were not protected by MFA and 1 in 5 used a weak, breached or reused password.
A question worth separating out:
Q: Should organisations prioritise passkeys over browser-based detection for SSO protection?
A: No single control is enough on its own. Passkeys reduce phishing success, but browser-based detection helps catch live AiTM pages and operator-led attacks that still get a user to interact. The strongest posture combines phishing-resistant authentication, browser-level inspection and tight recovery governance.
👉 Read our full editorial: Hybrid vishing and AiTM phishing are reshaping SSO defense