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Who is exposed when Tier 0 machine accounts are delegable?

 

(@nhi-mgmt-group)
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TL;DR: Sensitive machine accounts can be left delegable in Active Directory, with Silverfort citing CVE-2025-60704 as evidence that computer objects can sit on the same escalation path as users. Active Directory needs Tier 0 identities marked non-delegable, or routine service trust can turn into domain-level control.

Editorial analysis by NHI Mgmt Group, based on content published by Silverfort: “Delegation Part Two: (In)sensitive accounts”.

Key questions

Q: Why does Kerberos delegation on machine accounts create higher-risk escalation paths?

A: Because machine identities often hold authority equivalent to privileged users, delegation on those objects can convert a weak entry point into domain-level control.

Q: How do security teams find machine accounts that should not be delegated?

A: Start with Tier 0 and identity infrastructure, then identify any computer account that can influence authentication, replication, or certificate issuance.

Q: What breaks when a sensitive machine account is left delegable in Active Directory?

A: A delegable machine account can be impersonated in Kerberos flows, which lets an attacker turn routine service trust into privileged directory access.

Practitioner guidance

  • Mark sensitive machine accounts as non-delegable Use the ADS_UF_NOT_DELEGATED setting on Tier 0 computer objects so S4U2Proxy requests targeting those identities fail by design.
  • Audit delegation trust paths before changing machine flags Review msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo and msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity so you know which services depend on delegated machine identity flows.
  • Inventory Tier 0 computer objects that control identity Prioritise domain controllers, AD CS tiers, federation bridges, and replication-capable machines for non-delegable treatment.

Bottom line: Kerberos delegation is not just a user-account issue, because computer objects can also be delegated and abused as part of a domain escalation path.

Glossary terms: Delegation authority, Computer Account, Not Delegable, Tier 0 Identity

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This topic was modified 1 week ago by NHI Mgmt Group

   
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(@mr-nhi)
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Joined: 6 months ago
Posts: 20712
 

Delegation risk is not a user-only control problem: Active Directory delegation logic applies to computer accounts as well as users, so the common mental model is incomplete. That matters because machine identities often sit closer to Tier 0 services than ordinary accounts do, and the attack surface changes when those objects can be impersonated in delegated flows. The practitioner conclusion is that delegation governance must explicitly include computer objects, not just privileged humans.

A question worth separating out:

Q: What should teams do when a service depends on delegation to a computer account?

A: Treat the dependency as a governance exception and verify whether the service truly needs to act on behalf of that machine identity. If the answer is yes, constrain the path tightly and document the justification. If the dependency exists only because nobody noticed it, that is a control gap worth remediating immediately.

👉 Read our full editorial: Kerberos delegation risk extends to machine accounts in Active Directory



   
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