OpenTelemetry for AI agents: what it can and cannot prove

TL;DR: OpenTelemetry can help inventory AI agents, reconstruct sessions, and flag unusual activity, according to Kovrr, but it cannot by itself prove who authorised a privileged action or guarantee the record is complete enough for assurance. That boundary matters because governance needs evidence, not just observability, and intent telemetry must be joined with independent effect records.

Editorial analysis by NHI Mgmt Group, based on content published by Kovrr: “What OpenTelemetry Can and Cannot Tell You About Your AI Agents”.

Key questions

Q: What breaks when AI agent telemetry is used as proof of authorisation?

A: It breaks at the accountability step.

Q: Why do AI agent logs need to be joined with identity and cloud records?

A: Because the agent's own record is usually an intent record, while identity and cloud systems carry the enforcement or outcome record.

Q: What are the signs that AI agent telemetry is too weak for investigation?

A: If security teams can see prompts but cannot reconstruct tool invocations, retrievals, or data egress on the same principal, telemetry is incomplete.

Practitioner guidance

• Instrument independent corroboration paths Correlate agent telemetry with cloud audit, identity, and application logs so an agent's claimed action can be verified outside its own record.
• Treat telemetry configuration as a control surface Monitor writes to agent telemetry settings and alert when export stops, because a silent stream can indicate disabled observation rather than low activity.
• Validate vendor field conformance before rule writing Check which span attributes are stable, which are custom, and which versions your detections depend on before you encode governance rules.

Bottom line: OpenTelemetry can improve AI agent visibility, but it does not by itself prove authorisation, completion, or accountability.

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