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22/06/2026 10:04 am
TL;DR: Default Active Directory Certificate Services installations and misconfigured certificate templates can let attackers move from PKI footholds to enterprise admin privileges and even Global Administrator access in Entra, according to Netwrix. Certificate services are not just infrastructure plumbing, they are identity control points that must be governed like privilege-bearing systems.
NHIMG editorial — here’s why we think this discussion matters
Questions worth separating out
Q: What breaks when Active Directory Certificate Services templates are too permissive?
A: Permissive templates let an attacker request certificates that can authenticate as higher-value identities or support trust flows they should never reach.
Q: Why do certificate services create elevated risk in Microsoft identity environments?
A: Certificate services sit inside the trust chain for authentication, so a weak certificate authority can undermine both directory and cloud identity controls.
Practitioner guidance
- Audit certificate templates for privilege leakage Review enrolment permissions, subject name supply settings, authentication EKUs, and any template that can be used for logon or delegation.
- Map certificate trust paths to admin roles Trace which certificates can be accepted by Active Directory, Entra, and any federation or SSO path that leads to privileged access.
- Harden default AD CS installations before exposure Treat every default installation as unsafe until the issuance policies, enrollment agents, and template settings are validated against a secure baseline.
What to expect at the briefing
Netwrix's full webinar covers the operational detail this post intentionally leaves for the source:
- Walkthrough of default AD CS settings that create dangerous trust paths in Microsoft environments
- Analysis of certificate template misconfigurations that can be converted into enterprise admin access
- Speaker commentary on how AD CS abuse can extend from Active Directory into Entra privilege control
- Practical examples of where certificate issuance policy needs to be tightened first
👉 Register for Netwrix's webinar on AD CS misconfigurations and privilege escalation →
AD CS misconfigurations: are your certificate controls keeping up?
Explore further
22/06/2026 10:49 am
AD CS misconfiguration is not a certificate problem, it is an identity authority problem. When certificate templates are too permissive, the PKI layer stops enforcing identity boundaries and starts minting trust for the wrong principals. That turns a defensive trust service into a privilege escalation mechanism, which is why PKI governance belongs inside identity governance rather than outside it. Practitioners should treat certificate authority design as a control over who can become whom.
A few things that frame the scale:
- 53% of organisations have experienced a security incident directly related to machine identity management failures, according to The Critical Gaps in Machine Identity Management report.
- 69% of organisations now have more machine identities than human ones, which is why certificate services and workload identity controls are becoming governance-critical rather than back-office technicalities.
A question worth separating out:
Q: Who should own AD CS risk when it can affect both Active Directory and Entra?
A: Ownership should sit with identity governance, not just infrastructure or PKI operations. AD CS can create authentication trust that crosses directory and cloud control planes, so the accountable team must review issuance policy, privileged access impact, and lifecycle controls together.
👉 Read our full editorial: Active Directory Certificate Services misconfigurations expose domain compromise
