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27/06/2026 1:14 pm
TL;DR: Microsoft 365 misconfigurations, including excessive permissions, risky defaults, and mismanaged identity settings, create login paths attackers can abuse for account takeover and lateral movement, according to Abnormal AI. The security problem is not access alone but unmanaged identity exposure inside collaboration and permissions layers.
NHIMG editorial — here’s why we think this discussion matters
By the numbers:
- 90% of IT leaders say properly managing NHIs is essential for a successful zero-trust implementation.
- Only 5.7% of organisations have full visibility into their service accounts.
- 97% of NHIs carry excessive privileges, increasing unauthorised access and broadening the attack surface.
Questions worth separating out
Q: How should security teams reduce Microsoft 365 identity misconfigurations?
A: Start by reviewing tenant defaults, guest access, sharing controls, and delegated permissions as one access surface.
Q: Why do Microsoft 365 permissions create lateral movement risk?
A: Because collaboration platforms make broad permissions highly reusable once an attacker has a valid identity.
Practitioner guidance
- Audit Microsoft 365 defaults against actual business use Review tenant defaults, guest access, sharing settings, and collaboration permissions against current operating requirements, then disable or constrain anything that is not explicitly needed.
- Reduce entitlement sprawl across mail, files, and groups Map high-reach permissions to named business roles and remove broad membership, shared mailbox access, and delegated rights that are not essential.
- Create a recurring review for risky identity settings Establish a review cycle for privileged and collaboration settings that checks for standing exposure, stale delegations, and orphaned admin paths.
What to expect at the briefing
Abnormal AI's full webinar covers the operational detail this post intentionally leaves for the source:
- A breakdown of the most common Microsoft 365 misconfigurations attackers target in real environments.
- Practical examples of how identity, permissions, and collaboration features create account takeover paths.
- Discussion of how security teams discover these exposures before they become lateral movement opportunities.
- Guidance on strengthening posture through configuration review and control ownership.
👉 Watch Abnormal AI's webinar on hidden Microsoft 365 identity entry points →
Microsoft 365 misconfigurations: what IAM teams are missing?
Explore further
27/06/2026 2:30 pm
Microsoft 365 misconfiguration is really an identity control failure, not just an admin hygiene issue. The article's core claim is that attackers are exploiting the way identity and collaboration settings are assembled, not breaking through a technical perimeter. That means governance has to treat default exposure, entitlement sprawl, and delegated access as first-class identity risks. Practitioners should read this as a warning that configuration is part of the access model, not separate from it.
A few things that frame the scale:
- 97% of NHIs carry excessive privileges, increasing unauthorised access and broadening the attack surface, according to the Ultimate Guide to NHIs.
- Another finding shows that only 5.7% of organisations have full visibility into their service accounts, which means privilege review often starts from partial data rather than complete inventory.
A question worth separating out:
Q: Who is accountable when collaboration permissions create account takeover exposure?
A: Accountability should sit with the team that owns the identity and collaboration control plane, not only with the help desk or application administrator. IAM, messaging, and tenant administration need shared governance because risky permissions often cross those boundaries. The right framework question is who reviews, approves, and remediates the setting before it becomes an attack path.
👉 Read our full editorial: Microsoft 365 misconfigurations create hidden identity entry points
