Topic starter
09/06/2026 11:32 pm
TL;DR: Privileged accounts are needed only for short periods, yet they remain exposed when idle and can be misused by attackers or insiders, according to Netwrix. The governing problem is not just deployment cost but standing privilege that outlives the task and keeps the attack surface open.
Editorial analysis by NHI Mgmt Group, based on content published by Netwrix: “Security Renaissance: Why it's time to break with old-school PAM solutions”.
Key questions
Q: What breaks when privileged access is not routed through PAM?
A: When privileged actions bypass PAM, organisations lose the controls that make elevation accountable.
A: Standing privileged access creates a persistent path to high-value systems, which increases the chance of misuse, credential theft, and accidental overreach.
Practitioner guidance
- Inventory idle privileged exposure Identify privileged accounts that remain available outside active admin work, then classify which ones are truly task-bound versus permanently assigned.
- Move to task-scoped delegation Design access so the elevation exists only for the specific use case, then expires or is revoked when the activity ends.
- Centralise privileged session audit Record who received elevated access, for what purpose, and whether the session matched the approved scope.
Bottom line: Old-school PAM leaves a meaningful gap when privileged access remains available after the admin task ends.
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This topic was modified 2 days ago by NHI Mgmt Group
10/06/2026 1:54 am
Standing privilege is the core failure old-school PAM leaves behind. The problem is not merely that privileged access exists, but that it exists longer than the work that justifies it. That assumption was designed for a world where admins needed durable accounts and checked out access periodically. It fails when attackers can wait for the idle window or insiders can reuse access outside the intended task. The implication is that PAM governance has to be judged by how little privilege persists between jobs, not by how many vault features are deployed.
A few things that frame the scale:
- The average organisation believes more than 1 in 5 of their non-human identities are insufficiently secured, according to The 2024 ESG Report: Managing Non-Human Identities.
- Enterprises that have experienced a compromised NHI averaged 2.7 separate incidents in the past 12 months, which shows how quickly one identity problem can recur.
A question worth separating out:
Q: Who is accountable when privileged access is misused outside the intended task?
A: Accountability sits with the identity governance process that allowed standing privilege to persist, not only with the individual who abused it. If elevated access can be reused after the work is done, the programme has accepted residual risk into the control design. That is a PAM governance failure, not just an incident response issue.
👉 Read our full editorial: Old-school PAM leaves privileged access exposed when idle
11/06/2026 12:59 am
Standing privilege is the core failure old-school PAM leaves behind. The problem is not merely that privileged access exists, but that it exists longer than the work that justifies it. That assumption was designed for a world where admins needed durable accounts and checked out access periodically. It fails when attackers can wait for the idle window or insiders can reuse access outside the intended task. The implication is that PAM governance has to be judged by how little privilege persists between jobs, not by how many vault features are deployed.
A few things that frame the scale:
- The average organisation believes more than 1 in 5 of their non-human identities are insufficiently secured, according to The 2024 ESG Report: Managing Non-Human Identities.
- Enterprises that have experienced a compromised NHI averaged 2.7 separate incidents in the past 12 months, which shows how quickly one identity problem can recur.
A question worth separating out:
Q: Who is accountable when privileged access is misused outside the intended task?
A: Accountability sits with the identity governance process that allowed standing privilege to persist, not only with the individual who abused it. If elevated access can be reused after the work is done, the programme has accepted residual risk into the control design. That is a PAM governance failure, not just an incident response issue.
👉 Read our full editorial: Old-school PAM leaves privileged access exposed when idle
12/06/2026 2:33 am
Standing privilege is the core failure mode, not an implementation inconvenience. The article describes a governance model in which privileged access exists even when no administrative task is under way. That model is structurally vulnerable because attack opportunity persists during idle time, which is precisely when old-school PAM is supposed to be doing the most work. For practitioners, the question is whether privilege is still being treated as a durable state rather than an on-demand condition.
A few things that frame the scale:
- 97% of NHIs carry excessive privileges, increasing unauthorised access and broadening the attack surface, according to the Ultimate Guide to NHIs.
- 49% of IT professionals would prioritise improving privileged access management if the decision were theirs alone, according to Netwrix's 2023 Hybrid Security Trends Report.
A question worth separating out:
Q: How should teams govern privileged access when admins only need it briefly?
A: Teams should govern privileged access as a time-bound event with issuance, justification, and revocation tied to the task. That means the policy should define when elevation starts, who can approve it, how it is logged, and what ends it. The goal is to minimise standing privilege without blocking administrator productivity.
👉 Read our full editorial: Old-school PAM leaves privileged access exposed when idle
This post was modified 2 days ago by NHI Mgmt Group