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23/06/2026 9:18 pm
TL;DR: Identity configuration disaster recovery now extends to identity providers, with daily snapshots, drift detection, and restore workflows for SSO, MFA, app assignments, roles, and access rules across Okta, Microsoft Entra ID, OneLogin, Ping Identity, and JumpCloud. The practical issue is not backup alone but preserving the identity-to-system relationships that keep cloud access operating during incidents.
NHIMG editorial — what this means for NHI practitioners
By the numbers:
- Only 20% have formal processes for offboarding and revoking API keys, and even fewer have procedures for rotating them.
- Only 5.7% of organisations have full visibility into their service accounts.
Questions worth separating out
Q: How should security teams recover identity provider configurations after an incident?
A: They should restore versioned identity state, not rebuild access manually.
Q: Why do identity providers complicate disaster recovery planning?
A: Identity providers sit in the control plane, so a broken policy can block access even when servers and data are intact.
Q: What breaks when identity configuration drift is not tracked?
A: Recovery restores an uncertain policy state, which can cause authentication failures, disconnected applications, or unintended access changes.
Practitioner guidance
- Inventory identity configuration as recoverable state Map SSO, MFA, federation, app assignments, roles, groups, and directory dependencies into the same DR scope as infrastructure and SaaS systems.
- Test end-to-end identity restoration Run recovery exercises that restore a previous snapshot and verify that access works across connected applications, not just inside the identity provider.
- Track identity drift continuously Alert on unexpected changes to authentication policies, access rules, and delegated admin structures so the recovery baseline stays trustworthy.
What's in the full announcement
ControlMonkey's full article covers the operational detail this post intentionally leaves for the source:
- Daily snapshot capture across identity providers for rollback and audit use
- The configuration categories protected in the identity layer, including federation, MFA, roles, and app assignments
- How versioned restore supports recovery when access policies break during an incident
- The broader cloud configuration disaster recovery model that links identity, infrastructure, and observability
👉 Read ControlMonkey's analysis of identity disaster recovery for cloud environments →
Identity DR for IDPs: what IAM teams need to restore fast?
Explore further
25/06/2026 2:32 am
Identity disaster recovery is becoming a control-plane requirement, not an IT backup feature. Modern cloud environments fail when access state cannot be restored as quickly as compute or storage. The identity layer is the control plane that determines whether users, workloads, and administrators can reach anything after an incident. Practitioners should now measure recovery by restored access integrity, not by backup completion.
A few things that frame the scale:
- Only 5.7% of organisations have full visibility into their service accounts, according to Ultimate Guide to NHIs.
- Our research also shows that 97% of NHIs carry excessive privileges, which broadens attack surface and complicates recovery validation.
A question worth separating out:
Q: Who is accountable for restoring identity access during cloud incidents?
A: IAM, platform, and infrastructure teams share accountability because identity recovery crosses policy, application, and operational layers. The programme owner should define who can approve restores, who validates access, and which recovery checks prove that the restored state matches the intended control model.
👉 Read our full editorial: Identity disaster recovery for IDPs and cloud access control
