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25/06/2026 3:00 pm
TL;DR: 1024-bit encryption no longer meets long-term security expectations, according to DigiCert’s analysis, which notes Google’s move to deprecate DHE-based cipher suites, Chrome’s preference for ECDHE, and the practical costs of migrating to 2048-bit or elliptic-curve protection. The control question is no longer whether encryption exists, but whether key strength still matches modern threat and performance realities.
NHIMG editorial — based on content published by DigiCert: Moving Beyond 1024-Bit Encryption
By the numbers:
- Larger key lengths can reduce how many connections per second a server can handle by up to 80%.
- The 2048-bit key requires upwards of four times as much CPU usage.
Questions worth separating out
Q: How should security teams phase out 1024-bit encryption without breaking production services?
A: Start with an inventory of all certificates, endpoints, and service integrations that still depend on 1024-bit keys or legacy DHE suites.
Q: Why does weak encryption matter to IAM and machine identity programmes?
A: Because encryption is the trust layer behind authentication, session protection, and certificate-based identity.
Q: How do you know if your cryptographic baseline is actually secure enough?
A: You know it is not secure enough if any production path still negotiates obsolete cipher suites, relies on 1024-bit keys, or cannot be rotated without manual exceptions.
Practitioner guidance
- Inventory weak cryptographic baselines Find every certificate, service, and device still using 1024-bit keys or DHE-based cipher suites, then map where those paths are internet-facing, internal, or tied to workload identity.
- Prioritise reissue and reconfiguration Replace weak certificates first in trust-critical systems such as authentication endpoints, load balancers, and machine-to-machine channels before moving to less sensitive estates.
- Test the operational cost of stronger policy Measure throughput, CPU use, and latency after moving to 2048-bit or elliptic-curve settings so you can set enforcement dates without destabilising production.
What's in the full article
DigiCert's full blog covers the operational detail this post intentionally leaves for the source:
- Step-by-step guidance for evaluating which legacy systems still depend on 1024-bit encryption.
- Detailed performance considerations for moving from 1024-bit RSA or DHE to stronger key lengths.
- Practical reconfiguration steps for TLS cipher suites and certificate settings across enterprise environments.
- The rationale behind the transition from legacy cryptography to elliptic-curve approaches.
👉 Read DigiCert's analysis of why 1024-bit encryption is no longer sufficient →
1024-bit encryption and TLS risk: what IAM teams should know?
Explore further
25/06/2026 4:17 pm
1024-bit encryption represents a trust assumption that no longer matches modern attack economics. It was designed for an era when the cost of factoring made private-key recovery impractical for most adversaries. That assumption fails as computing power rises and the effective work factor falls, which means the control no longer provides the security margin the organisation thinks it does. The implication is that cryptographic governance must be based on current breakability, not historical acceptability.
A few things that frame the scale:
- Larger key lengths can reduce how many connections per second a server can handle by up to 80%, according to The State of Non-Human Identity Security.
- Only 1.5 out of 10 organisations are highly confident in their ability to secure NHIs, compared to nearly 1 in 4 for securing human identities.
A question worth separating out:
Q: What should organisations do when stronger encryption increases CPU usage?
A: Treat performance as part of the migration plan, not a reason to delay it. Benchmark the impact of stronger keys on connection throughput and CPU load, tune capacity where needed, and then lock in policy so legacy cryptography does not re-enter through convenience exceptions.
👉 Read our full editorial: Why 1024-bit encryption is no longer a safe enterprise baseline
