TL;DR: Account takeover attacks are rising, with exposed credentials, phishing, and social engineering driving fraud, theft, and brand damage, according to SecureAuth. The real issue is not just authentication strength but the broader reset, device, and behavioural controls that determine whether stolen credentials can be turned into usable access.
NHIMG editorial — based on content published by SecureAuth: Account takeover (ATO) attacks are surging and 10 essential prevention tips
By the numbers:
- 24B credentials exposed in breaches increases the supply of reusable passwords that account takeover crews can weaponise.
- 65% increase in account takeover attacks year over, year shows how quickly abuse scales when password reuse remains common.
- $12K average cost per account takeover incident shows, why prevention is cheaper than post-compromise recovery.
Questions worth separating out
Q: What breaks when account takeover defences rely only on MFA?
A: MFA alone fails when the attacker avoids the strongest sign-in path and pivots to password reset, reused passwords, or automation that makes many attempts cheaply.
Q: Why do previously compromised credentials keep creating account takeover risk?
A: Because password reuse, stale access paths, and weak proofing let old identity data function as a current authentication input.
Q: How do you know if account takeover controls are actually working?
A: Look for reduced successful takeovers, lower fraud losses, and preserved good-user throughput at the same time.
Practitioner guidance
- Implement breach-password screening at login and password change Check candidate passwords against known breach databases before allowing reuse, and block passwords that appear in public compromise sets.
- Harden password reset as a high-risk access path Require stronger verification for reset than for routine login, especially when the reset email, phone, or device is newly associated with the account.
- Deploy phishing-resistant MFA for sensitive journeys Use FIDO2 passkeys or hardware keys for account changes, new device enrolment, and step-up events so that reusable secrets are not the only protection.
What's in the full article
SecureAuth's full article covers the operational detail this post intentionally leaves for the source:
- Step-by-step prevention tips for phishing-resistant MFA, credential screening, bot detection, and passwordless adoption.
- Practical login and recovery controls that reduce takeover risk across consumer identity journeys.
- Behavioral biometrics and device-recognition examples for suspicious login detection.
- Guidance on smart account lockout design that avoids denial-of-service side effects.
👉 Read SecureAuth's account takeover prevention tips and identity controls →
Account takeover prevention: are your IAM controls keeping up?
Explore further
Account takeover is a lifecycle failure, not a login failure. The article correctly frames takeover as a chain that includes password reuse, credential screening, reset flows, and behavioural detection. That aligns with how attackers actually operate: they do not need to defeat every control, only the weakest handoff in the identity journey. Practitioners should treat CIAM as an end-to-end access path, not an authentication checkpoint.
A few things that frame the scale:
- 72% of organisations have experienced or suspect they have experienced a breach of non-human identities, according to The 2024 ESG Report: Managing Non-Human Identities.
- Enterprises that have experienced a compromised NHI averaged 2.7 separate incidents in the past 12 months, according to the same report.
A question worth separating out:
Q: How should organisations reduce account takeover risk in email channels?
A: Start by enforcing DMARC, then add visible trust signals such as BIMI and certificate-backed sender validation where mailbox providers support them. The goal is to help recipients make faster, safer decisions at the point of reading email, while making brand impersonation harder for attackers.
👉 Read our full editorial: ATO prevention tips highlight the limits of legacy MFA