Base44 and AI platform identity gaps: what IAM teams missed

TL;DR: Wiz’s Base44 findings show that private apps could be accessed with only a public app_id, with no authentication, no SSO, and no identity verification, according to Defakto Security. The lesson is broader than one platform: when non-human actors drive access, human IAM controls stop being a sufficient security model.

NHIMG editorial — based on content published by Defakto Security: Real-World Lessons Wiz’s Base44 Vulnerability Findings Spotlight a Fixable Gap: Non-Human Identity

By the numbers:

• 92% of organisations expose NHIs to third parties, raising concerns about supply chain security.
• 97% of NHIs carry excessive privileges, increasing unauthorised access and broadening the attack surface.
• Only 5.7% of organisations have full visibility into their service accounts.

Questions worth separating out

Q: What breaks when platforms treat public identifiers as access control?

A: Public identifiers can name a resource, but they do not prove identity.

Q: Why do non-human identities complicate traditional IAM models?

A: Traditional IAM is designed around interactive users, browser sessions, and human-centric controls such as SSO and MFA.

Q: What do security teams get wrong about service onboarding?

A: They often treat service onboarding as an operational shortcut instead of a security boundary.

Practitioner guidance

• Inventory every service-facing endpoint List APIs, internal calls, onboarding flows, and automation hooks that currently rely on public identifiers, environment trust, or naming conventions instead of verified identity.
• Remove self-approval from onboarding flows Require explicit verification before services, workloads, or AI-enabled actors can create accounts, obtain credentials, or enter restricted environments.
• Bind access to cryptographic proof Replace implicit trust with request-level identity proof so that each call can be evaluated against a known actor and policy boundary.

What's in the full article

Defakto Security's full blog post covers the operational detail this post intentionally leaves for the source:

• The specific Base44 request path and why a public app_id was enough to expose private applications.
• The practical examples Defakto uses to show where identity checks were missing across onboarding and API access.
• The team-ready control shifts for enforcing proof of identity on non-human access paths.
• The article's broader defensive checklist for finding hidden trust assumptions in AI-enabled platforms.

👉 Read Defakto Security's analysis of the Base44 non-human identity flaw →

Base44 and AI platform identity gaps: what IAM teams missed?

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