Topic starter
24/06/2026 11:34 pm
TL;DR: Break-glass access is temporary privileged access for emergencies, but the article notes that it bypasses MFA, approvals, and standard workflows, which raises misuse and compliance risk; it also stresses that IGA, logging, alerts, and JIT workflows are needed to keep emergency access accountable, according to SecurEnds. The real issue is that emergency access often outlives the control assumptions built into ordinary access governance.
Editorial analysis by NHI Mgmt Group, based on content published by SecurEnds: “Break-Glass Access Explained: Risks, Controls, and IGA Best Practices”.
Key questions
Q: What breaks when break-glass access is not tightly governed?
A: Break-glass access turns into permanent privileged backdoor risk when it is not tightly governed.
Q: When should organisations prioritise JIT access over break-glass accounts?
A: Organisations should prioritise just-in-time access when the work is urgent but predictable, because JIT gives temporary privilege with a clearer end state.
Q: How do you know whether emergency access is actually working?
A: Emergency access is working only if every activation is visible, time-bounded, and reviewed after the event.
Practitioner guidance
- Define a break-glass lifecycle Document activation, approval bypass conditions, time limits, and required closure steps so emergency access has a clear beginning and end.
- Automate post-incident certification Trigger a recertification review after every emergency access event so owners confirm why the account was used and whether it still needs to exist.
- Enforce expiry on all emergency privilege Use timed deprovisioning or forced disablement so break-glass accounts cannot remain active after the incident response window closes.
Bottom line: Break-glass access is necessary for continuity, but it becomes a governance risk when it bypasses normal identity controls without a clear lifecycle.
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25/06/2026 8:31 am
Break-glass access is a governed exception, not a separate trust model: The control objective is to preserve service continuity without creating a second, weaker identity regime. Once emergency access bypasses MFA, approvals, and workflow checks, the organisation has created a privilege path that is operationally necessary but structurally dangerous. The implication is that emergency access must be designed as part of the normal governance fabric, not exempt from it.
A few things that frame the scale:
- Nearly 60% of IT leaders cite restrictive cost and complexity as a weakness of legacy identity governance, according to the 2025 State of Identity Governance Report.
A question worth separating out:
Q: Who is accountable when break glass access is used in a healthcare identity programme?
A: Accountability should sit with the access owner, the security governance function, and the audit process together. Break glass access must be time bound, logged, reviewed, and tied to a documented operational need. Without clear ownership, emergency access becomes standing privilege by another name, which undermines compliance and makes post-incident review difficult.
👉 Read our full editorial: Break-glass access governance is where RBAC and IGA fail