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Topic starter
24/06/2026 11:34 pm
TL;DR: Break-glass access is temporary privileged access for emergencies, but the article notes that it bypasses MFA, approvals, and standard workflows, which raises misuse and compliance risk; it also stresses that IGA, logging, alerts, and JIT workflows are needed to keep emergency access accountable, according to SecurEnds. The real issue is that emergency access often outlives the control assumptions built into ordinary access governance.
NHIMG editorial — based on content published by SecurEnds: break-glass access governance, risks, and IGA best practices
By the numbers:
- 96% of organisations store secrets outside of secrets managers in vulnerable locations including code, config files, and CI/CD tools.
- 72% of organisations have experienced or suspect they have experienced a breach of non-human identities , 46% confirmed, 26% suspected.
- Only 5.7% of organisations have full visibility into their service accounts.
Questions worth separating out
Q: How should security teams govern break-glass access without creating standing privilege?
A: Security teams should separate emergency access from normal administrative entitlement, give it explicit activation criteria, and force automatic expiry after use.
Q: Why does break-glass access create so much audit and compliance risk?
A: Break-glass access often bypasses MFA, approvals, and standard workflow evidence in the exact moments when accountability matters most.
Q: What breaks when emergency privileged access is not tightly expired and reviewed?
A: What breaks is the assumption that exceptional access is short-lived and fully reconcilable after the incident.
Practitioner guidance
- Separate emergency access from standard admin roles Create a distinct break-glass workflow with explicit activation criteria, restricted audience, and documented closure steps so emergency use never becomes normal privilege.
- Enforce automatic expiry on all emergency credentials Set short-lived access windows and automatic deactivation so credentials cannot remain valid after the P0 response is complete.
- Log and alert on every break-glass activation Capture account, approver, timestamp, and reason for use, then alert IAM, PAM, and security operations immediately when emergency access is invoked.
What's in the full article
SecurEnds' full article covers the operational detail this post intentionally leaves for the source:
- Role-based access control design choices for emergency and privileged workflows
- Step-by-step IGA workflow examples for approvals, certifications, and revocation
- Practical comparisons of RBAC, ABAC, and PBAC for access governance
- Implementation guidance for using dashboards and certifications to reduce privilege creep
👉 Read SecurEnds' analysis of break-glass access governance and IGA controls →
Break-glass access governance: are your emergency controls safe?
Explore further
25/06/2026 8:31 am
Break-glass access is a governance exception that must be treated as a lifecycle, not a shortcut. The article correctly frames emergency access as necessary for recovery, but the real discipline is to define how it is created, used, observed, and closed. If the access path exists outside the normal privilege lifecycle, it becomes a standing exception that security teams may not be able to audit cleanly. Practitioner implication: govern emergency access as a bounded identity state, not an ad hoc rescue mechanism.
A few things that frame the scale:
- 91.6% of secrets remain valid five days after the targeted organisation is notified, showing a critical gap in remediation procedures, according to Ultimate Guide to NHIs.
- Only 5.7% of organisations have full visibility into their service accounts, which is why emergency privilege without clean governance becomes difficult to audit.
A question worth separating out:
Q: Who is accountable when break-glass access is used during a P0 incident?
A: Accountability should sit with the incident owner, the privilege owner, and the governance function that defines the emergency access policy. The process should require a clear reason for use, a named approver or authoriser where possible, and a documented closure step so responsibility does not disappear after recovery.
👉 Read our full editorial: Break-glass access governance is where RBAC and IGA fail
