TL;DR: Centralized identity management simplifies access across legacy, cloud, and remote environments by unifying SSO, recertification, and monitoring, according to Soffid. Fragmented IAM stacks increase administrative overhead, weaken visibility, and leave access pathways unchecked, making operational complexity a security problem rather than just an IT inconvenience.
NHIMG editorial — based on content published by Soffid: Gestión centralizada de identidades, reduce la complejidad en entornos híbridos
By the numbers:
- Only 5.7% of organisations have full visibility into their service accounts.
- 79% of organisations have experienced secrets leaks, with 77% of these incidents resulting in tangible damage.
Questions worth separating out
Q: How should security teams centralize identity management in hybrid environments?
A: Security teams should centralize identity management by making one system authoritative for identity state, access approval, and revocation, then federating that state consistently to cloud, on-premises, and remote systems.
Q: Why does fragmented IAM increase operational and security risk?
A: Fragmented IAM increases risk because access data, review states, and revocation actions diverge across tools.
Q: How do teams know whether centralized identity management is working?
A: It is working when access changes are applied consistently, recertification is complete across all environments, and revocation happens without manual reconciliation.
Practitioner guidance
- Inventory every identity control plane Catalogue where authentication, access reviews, revocation, PAM, and reporting are managed today.
- Unify joiner-mover-leaver workflows Make one authoritative lifecycle path for user and service access changes so entitlement updates are not reimplemented differently in each environment.
- Consolidate recertification evidence Build a single review package for access certification across cloud, on-premises, and privileged systems so reviewers can validate the full entitlement picture without manual cross-checking.
What's in the full article
Soffid's full post covers the operational detail this post intentionally leaves for the source:
- How the platform unifies SSO, IGA, AM, and PAM into a single operational view for hybrid environments.
- How centralized recertification and lifecycle automation are presented in the vendor's own implementation model.
- How the article frames productivity, cost reduction, and access visibility across legacy, cloud, and remote estates.
👉 Read Soffid's analysis of centralized identity management for hybrid environments →
Centralized identity management in hybrid environments: what changes for teams?
Explore further
Fragmented identity control is a governance failure before it is an architecture problem. When access policies, recertification states, and revocation workflows live in separate products, the organisation no longer has one authoritative view of entitlement. That undermines lifecycle governance across human and non-human identities alike. The practical conclusion is that identity sprawl should be treated as a control gap, not just an implementation inconvenience.
A few things that frame the scale:
- Only 5.7% of organisations have full visibility into their service accounts, according to the Ultimate Guide to NHIs.
- Another 96% of organisations store secrets outside secrets managers in vulnerable locations including code, config files, and CI/CD tools, according to the Ultimate Guide to NHIs.
A question worth separating out:
Q: Who is accountable when centralized IAM still leaves access gaps?
A: Accountability sits with the identity governance owner, not the individual tool owners, because the programme failed to produce a single control model. If different teams can approve, provision, and revoke access independently, then no one owns the full access lifecycle. That is a governance design failure, not just an operational miss.
👉 Read our full editorial: Centralized identity management reduces hybrid IAM complexity